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SUMMARY
The research objective of this thesis is to formulate and demonstrate a computational
framework for modeling the design decisions of engineers. This framework is intended to be
descriptive in nature as opposed to prescriptive or normative; the output of the model repre-
sents a plausible result of a designer’s decision making process. The framework decomposes
the decision into three elements: the problem statement, the designer’s beliefs about the
alternatives, and the designer’s preferences. Multi-attribute utility theory is used to capture
designer preferences for multiple objectives under uncertainty. Machine-learning techniques
are used to store the designer’s knowledge and to make Bayesian inferences regarding the
attributes of alternatives. These models are integrated into the framework of a Markov
decision process to simulate multiple sequential decisions. The overall framework enables
the designer’s decision problem to be transformed into an optimization problem statement;
the simulated designer selects the alternative with the maximum expected utility. Although
utility theory is typically viewed as a normative decision framework, the perspective in this
research is that the approach can be used in a descriptive context for modeling rational and
non-time critical decisions by engineering designers. This approach is intended to enable the
formalisms of utility theory to be used to design human subjects experiments involving en-
gineers in design organizations based on pairwise lotteries and other methods for preference
elicitation. The results of these experiments would substantiate the selection of parameters
in the model to enable it to be used to diagnose potential problems in engineering design
projects.
The purpose of the decision-making framework is to enable the development of a de-
sign process simulation of an organization involved in the development of a large-scale
complex engineered system such as an aircraft or spacecraft. The decision model will allow
researchers to determine the broader effects of individual engineering decisions on the aggre-
gate dynamics of the design process and the resulting performance of the designed artifact
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itself. To illustrate the model’s applicability in this context, the framework is demonstrated
on three example problems: a one-dimensional decision problem, a multidimensional tur-
bojet design problem, and a variable fidelity analysis problem. Individual utility functions
are developed for designers in a requirements-driven design problem and then combined
into a multi-attribute utility function. Gaussian process models are used to represent the
designer’s beliefs about the alternatives, and a custom covariance function is formulated to




This thesis concerns the development of a computational framework for modeling engineer-
ing decision making. The effort to develop this framework was inspired by the needs of
a separate research project to simulate the dynamics and performance of an engineering
organization1. Since our models are designed to fit within the context of the organizational
dynamics simulation, the requirements for these models are largely driven by the needs of
the simulation. This section will outline the motivation behind the simulation which will in
turn define the requirements for this research.
While the aerospace industry has developed numerous successful programs in the past
several decades, it has also had its share of setbacks and problems. Cost and schedule
overruns are becoming a ubiquitous part of large-scale aerospace development programs.
Figure 1 shows Norman Augustine’s famous plot of aircraft unit cost over time which has
been updated with more recent information from the United States Naval Institute [7, 15].
The cost of military aircraft is growing exponentially, far outpacing inflation. A 2009
Government Accountability Office report found DoD acquisition programs to be an average
of 42% over initial budget estimates and delayed by an average of 22 months. Commercial
development programs share a similar trend in cost growth, albeit less pronounced than
military programs. To maintain competitiveness, the aerospace industry needs to both
better estimate and control cost and schedules.
The extant literature identifies many potential causes for these problems, and it is
unlikely that all issues are attributable to just a single cause. One relatively unexplored
area of research investigates the dynamics of large engineering organizations. Consider the
weight growth of the F/A-22 and the F/A-18E/F development programs shown in Figure 2











































Figure 1: Exponential growth in aircraft production cost over time
takeoff weight over time. The square and circle denote preliminary (PDR) and critical design
reviews (CDR), respectively. The dynamics of the two programs have some similarities but
also some striking differences. The F-22 remains above the desired weight during the entire
design phase and exhibits more pronounced fluctuations; notice the sharp decreases in
weight just before PDR and the growth immediately after. The behavior of the F-18E/F
remains closer to its target and is generally more tame. At the same time, both programs
feature steady weight growth after CDR. These curves share many similarities to plots
of a dynamical system’s response over time. Theoretically, we could view an engineering
organization from the perspective of a dynamical system. If we could identify the features
of the program that led to a particular set of dynamics, perhaps we could “design” the
organization to behave more like than F-18E/F development program than the F-22.
Modeling an organization in such a way can be challenging, since an organization is
made up of numerous entities which are constantly interacting. Figure 3 shows a network
of engineering change requests taken from a study regarding change propagation [27]. The
research team studied change requests in a US government contract program involving a











































Figure 2: Comparison of weight growth in F-22 and F-18E/F
team documented over 41,500 change requests during the course of eight years. The dia-
gram shows the largest network of change requests, a total of 2,566. This figure illustrates
the complexity of large-scale engineering systems; even seemingly isolated design decisions
can have extraordinary consequences. Yet, designers are likely unable to perceive the conse-
quences of their own decisions far beyond their own discipline. The research team summed
up the complexity of the problem with the following quote:
“Through the change network analysis we found that change propagation in large
technical systems is actually much more complicated than we thought initially.”
Figure 3: Network of 2566 engineering change requests
The focus of the overarching organization simulation is represented graphically in Figure
4. The performance of an organization and the resulting value of the designed system
12
are influenced by three major elements: the design problem which includes requirements,
organizational goals, and external influences; the decisions of the individual designers and/or
design teams; and the dynamics of the organization. These elements, however, are not
independent from one another; each is coupled and provides feedback to the others as
shown by the bi-directional arrows in the figure. Our ultimate goal is to understand the
center of Figure 4, the organization performance and the resulting system value. To enable
this capability, this thesis will focus on developing a model of the decision element with the
intention of later combining it with the other two elements. In order maintain flexibility
within the simulation, the framework was developed to be independent of any specific design
problem or design strategy. The simulated designer can make decisions under multiple
objectives with or without uncertainty. The framework is robust enough to manage decisions











Figure 4: Engineering organization as a coupled dynamical system
1.1 Scope and Motivating Requirements
Before examining the details of the framework, I would like to explicitly define the intended
scope. The models used in this framework are intended to be descriptive of human designers,
where the word “descriptive” is used as an antithesis to normative and prescriptive. This
13
framework attempts to mimic the decisions that engineers make in reality, not necessarily
the decisions that they should make. Similarly, the framework is not intended to be a formal
prescriptive method for arriving at a decision to an actual design problem.
At the same time, this model is not intended to replicate a designer’s cognitive reasoning
process about the design problem. At no point do I claim that designers follow the process
outlined in this thesis when making decisions, nor will I claim that the human brain operates
in this manner. Rather, this model is intended to mimic the outcome of the reasoning
process.
If this model does not accurately represent the manner in which humans reason, then of
what use is the model for predicting decisions? In his book, The Sciences of the Artificial,
Herbert Simon makes an important distinction between the inner environment and the outer
environment of a system [64]. To borrow his example, consider both a grandfather clock
and a digital wristwatch. These artifacts have completely different inner environments;
the parts and mechanisms of one have almost no similarity to the other. However, at the
interface of the inner and outer environment, where the user looks at the clock-face to read
the time, both clocks provide the exact same functionality. Though they operate in entirely
different ways, they are both capable of accurately displaying the time. As long as the
inner environment of each clock is well suited for its outer environment, their function will
be indistinguishable. This will not be the case at the extremes of their outer environment;
for example, if we took both clocks out to sea in a violently rocking ship, the grandfather
clock would struggle to keep proper time, while the digital wristwatch would hardly notice
the difference. Simon’s point is that our models do not have to accurately reflect the
inner environment, so long as we are cautious when placing them in an appropriate outer
environment.
For this framework, this “interface” between the inner and outer environment is the
outcome of the designer’s reasoning, his or her final decision which leads to an irrevoca-
ble allocation of resources. The outer environment consists of the designer’s knowledge,
incentives, and the details of the engineering organization. Two major challenges of this
research are (1) to determine the appropriate outer environment for the model and (2) to
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validate the behavior at the interface. For this reason, care will be taken to list all pertinent
assumptions used when formulating the models and their fundamental limitations. To reit-
erate, the inner environment of this model is not intended to match the inner environment
of human thought. This model is at best an approximation of decisions that one might
plausibly expect from a decision maker.
In order to replicate human decision making for a variety of design problems, the simu-
lation should share some of the characteristics and abilities of its human counterpart. The
following requirements were identified as essential characteristics of the framework:
• Models decisions that a human designer would actually make, not necessarily the
decision he or she should make (ideally, the framework would also allow for testing of
both normative and descriptive models).
• Capable of including the influences of the design problem and organizational dynamics
on the designer’s decision.
• Independent of a particular ruleset or strategy employed by a designer.
• Of sufficient specificity for computation.
• Capable of specifying relative preferences for designs with multiple attributes. This
is especially important when the designer is faced with trade-offs between attributes.
• Capable of storing relevant knowledge about the design alternatives.
• Capable of updating knowledge in the presence of new information.
• Capable of making a decision in both the presence and absence of a feasible design
space.
• Capable of developing a strategy when making multiple sequential decisions.
The goal of this thesis is to formulate a framework with appropriate models that meet these
requirements.
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of relevant
literature on this topic. Chapter 3 introduces the proposed framework for isolated decisions
and derives models for implementation. Chapter 4 then demonstrates the framework on two
example problems. Chapter 5 extends the framework to account for sequential decisions.
This extension is then tested on two sequential decision problems in Chapter 6. Chapter
15
7 explores the limitations of the model and provides recommendations for improving the
model with a human subjects experiment. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the contributions




This chapter provides a summary of relevant literature. Our research encompasses a variety
of topics from design theory to artificial intelligence. For this reason, a complete and detailed
description of all the relevant literature falls beyond the scope of this document. Several
pertinent topics are identified and their relationship to the research goal is established. The
purpose of this chapter is to provide a concise overview of past research, illustrating the
ways in which models from the literature fulfills aspects of the motivating requirements
while also showing the ways in which these models are insufficient. After examining the
literature I will identify noticeable gaps which this thesis intends to fill.
2.1 Design Theory
For this project, it is important to have a clear understanding of the nature of design
and the processes it entails. Forming a clear definition allows for the development of a
concise model while still encompassing all the pertinent characteristics of the design process.
Although numerous definitions and theories abound, this section will focus only on the work
of Hazelrigg, Gero, and Simon. For additional models, schema, and definitions of design,
see References [59, 68, 70].
Hazelrigg defines design as a decision-making process [30]. This stands in contrast to
other definitions of design which often characterize it as a problem-solving process. Hazel-
rigg argues that problems are independent of the designer’s resources and preferences; the
solution to a problem is only dependent on the problem statement. Decisions, on the
other hand, incorporate human values in order to rank alternatives. Since designers must
also manage their resources, they are more appropriately viewed as decision makers than
problem solvers.
Gero defines design as a process to “transform requirements, which embody the expecta-
tions and purposes of the resulting artifact, into design descriptions [25].” Gero’s definition
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is based on his Function, Behavior, Structure model of design: the function represents the
purpose of the artifact; the artifact’s behavior encompasses the characteristics that allow
it to perform the desired function; finally, the structure is a description of the artifact,
usually in the form of engineering drawings. Hence, the purpose of design is to transform
requirements (function) into a design description (structure). The difficulty of design lies
in the mapping between these three constructs; while a structure maps to a behavior and a
behavior fulfills a function, there typically is no direct mapping between function and struc-
ture. Gero proposes that designers use “prototypes,” canonical mental models of designs
that fulfill specific functions, to create this mapping.
Additionally, Gero makes a distinction between different types of design, which he de-
notes as routine, innovative, and creative. Routine design occurs in a well-defined space of
potential designs, a space in which the designer has experience. Innovative design uses the
same design variables as routine design, but considers values outside their typical range.
Finally, creative design adds to the design space, incorporating entirely new design variables.
One can find similarities between Gero’s classification and Simon’s distinction between
a well-structured and an ill-structured problem [63]. Rather than drawing a distinct bound-
ary, Simon views the structure of problems as a continuum. Well-structured problems are
usually characterized by their precisely defined components: the problem statement and
goal are clear and explicit, and the problem-solver has a definite procedure for testing each
alternative. Ill-structured problems are simply the opposite of well-structured problems. Si-
mon considers most design activities to be closer to the ill-structured end of the spectrum.
Simon also introduces the concept of bounded rationality, the idea that humans often
must make decisions with incomplete information, limited computation ability, and a finite
amount of time [62]. Since exploring the design space requires allocation of resources,
designers are not willing to search indefinitely for an optimal solution; often they know an
optimal design is not necessary, and finding the true optimal may not be possible. Instead,
Simon argues that humans often use satisficing over optimization; designers are interested
in finding a satisfactory answer rather than the best answer. While there is much debate
over the use of optimization versus satisificing, empirical evidence shows that practicing
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engineers tend to satisfice [28, 29].
2.2 Empirical Studies of Designers
Numerous studies have been performed of practicing engineers and design teams to better
understand their needs and behavior. This section highlights just a few relevant articles
from this large body of literature. The literature has been divided into two very broad
categories: designer behavior and designer cognition.
2.2.1 Designer Behavior
There is a large body of literature observing students and practicing engineers both in the
field and in a laboratory setting. To give just a few examples, much research has focused
on the differences between expert and novice designers [6, 4, 3, 2] and the effects of time
and deadlines on performance [58, 51, 61, 49, 72]. Many of these studies do not attempt to
explain the mechanisms behind the phenomena but rather give insights into the designers’
needs with a goal of developing tools to assist the engineers in designing. Mehalik and
Schunn provide a review of numerous empirical design studies [46].
2.2.2 Designer Cognition
In addition to observing designer and team behavior, researchers have also tried to under-
stand the mental processes behind the designer’s behavior. A well-known example is design
fixation, a designers’ tendency to replicate designs that they have already seen and resis-
tance to departing from their original ideas [33, 54]. Other researchers have examined the
designers’ processes through diaries or think-aloud studies [8, 18]. Cross provides a broad
review of research into the cognitive processes of design [17].
The design cognition and behavior literature provide many insights into specific behav-
iors of engineers. However, the literature is still far from developing a robust model of design
decision-making. While this research can be used to validate certain aspects of a model, it
likely cannot be used to formulate a decision-making model. For this reason, our models
are developed at a higher level of abstraction than designer cognition; our framework does
not model the designer’s thoughts but artificially mimics the designer’s behavior and the
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resulting design outcome from this behavior.
2.3 Modeling the Design Process in Organizations
Many researchers have developed models of the design process in organizations using various
theories and techniques. This section provides an overview of the most relevant models.
2.3.1 Computational Organization Theory
Perhaps the most relevant literature for this research comes from the field of Computational
Organization Theory (COT). COT represents members of an organization as information
processors, where the role of the members is to transfer information from one form to an-
other. Several platforms have been developed for computationally modeling organizations;
Virtual Design Teams [34], for example, was specifically designed to model engineering
organizations. Carley and Gasser provide a thorough review of this subject [11].
Virtual Design Teams (VDT) is a computational platform that originated from Stanford
in the 1980s [34], and it is likely the closest model to our research topic. VDT was designed
with a conscious effort to maintain a relatively high-level of abstraction. Based on research
by Galbraith [23], people inside the organization are modeled as information processing
units, and the length of each of the organization’s tasks is calculated by estimating the time
for information processing. The model defines numerical parameters for capturing elements
of the problem and organization such as “task complexity” and “skill of the designer”. Tasks
are encoded in terms of work volume, a unit that represents the amount of information
processing work.
While VDT has been successful in modeling organizations, it is unable to capture specific
design decisions. The model abstracts away the actual design problem and treats the design
process simply as a task to be performed. Setbacks and rework are more or less seen as
random events with no tenable cause. In this way, VDT is able to capture the overall
dynamics of the organization but gives little insight into the performance of the designed
system. The models also rely considerably on the modeler’s ability to specify all the relevant
tasks and their characteristics ahead of time.
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2.3.2 Design Structure Matrices
Design Structure Matrices (DSM) are a visual representation of information dependencies
and feedback in a system [21]. Tasks in the system are represented in both rows and
columns of a square matrix. The diagonal matrix entries represent task completion times.
Off-diagonal terms represent dependencies among tasks. Smith and Eppinger use the design
structure matrix extensively to model sequential iteration in engineering design [65, 66].
Each task has a probability of repetition related by the strength of task coupling; this
allows for an estimation of rework in an engineering design. DSM allows for the reordering
of tasks and restructuring of design decomposition in a system to reduce feedback and can
provide estimates of total development time [20, 52].
2.3.3 Game Theory
Certain authors have studied decentralized design in the context of game theory. Lewis
and Mistree use various communication protocols from game theory such as cooperative,
non-cooperative, and Stackelberg leader-follower [43, 42]. From these protocols, the authors
simulate organizations and analyze characteristics such as convergence and performance of
the resulting design. Given a non-cooperative design “game,” authors have investigated the
conditions under which the design problem will converge [12, 13].
The use of game theory seems intuitive, since the design process in a large organization
is composed of many players with potentially conflicting interests, each bearing an influence
on the final design. However, the validity of the use of game theory lies in the extent to
which designers perceive their actions as a game. As Rasmusen states, “Game theory is
not useful when decisions are made that ignore the reactions of others or treat them as
impersonal market forces [55].” If designers do not perceive their actions as being part of
game, then the resulting behavior is more typical of a dynamical system. In fact, the authors
of this research consider only relatively näıve strategies and not optimal strategies since the
designers are given incomplete information. While this research ostensibly captures all three
elements in Figure 4, the current literature tends to ignore formulating how a designer comes
to a particular solution and assumes arbitrary problems and objective functions.
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2.3.4 Multidisciplinary Design and Optimization (MDO) Architectures
Several types of MDO architectures were inspired by the protocols and hierarchies of en-
gineering organizations. Collaborative Optimization (CO) is an optimization scheme that
divides the optimization along disciplinary lines, similar to the divisions in an engineering
organization [38]. Each disciplinary analysis has its own optimizer and is only concerned
with its local design variables and constraints. Coordination and consistency are maintained
by a system level optimizer.
Analytic Target Cascading (ATC) is an optimization scheme similar to CO [40]. In this
framework, a top-level optimizer sends children nodes a set of targets, both for objectives
and consistency requirements. Each child node can run a unique optimizer, specifically
tailored for its design sub-problem. The child nodes can also send targets to its own children,
allowing for an unlimited number of hierarchical levels.
While not an MDO architecture, Compromise Decision Support Problem (DSP) is a
optimization technique from the goal programming literature [47]. Compromise DSP uses
goals rather than objectives, similar to the way that engineers are often given requirements.
“Hard” goals, or rigid requirements, are used as constraints on the optimizer. “Soft” goals
are then rank ordered by importance; the optimizer uses a lexicographic minimum to de-
termine the “optimal” design.
2.4 Other Relevant Models
Researches have also constructed models of specific problem-solving behavior. For example,
Cagan and Kotovsky observed people repeatedly playing Tower of Hanoi problems and
used simulated annealing-based algorithms to mimic the observed behavior [10]. Olson
used a combination of simulated annealing and genetic algorithms to create a multi-agent
simulation of an organization based on observations of a design team [50].
The field of Artificial Intelligence was explored with mixed results. Machine learning
techniques were found to be useful for certain aspects of the framework, as described in
Section 3.3. Artificial intelligent systems are becoming more commonplace as decision
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support systems. Expert systems were prolific in the 1980s and are highly effective for well-
structured problems with a relatively narrow focus [45]. Schank and Abelson’s scripts, plans,
and frames construct for storing and recalling knowledge is still widely used in systems today
[60]. For modern design support systems, the concept of knowledge-based engineering, or
the process of integrating expert knowledge into computer systems, has become increasingly
popular with tools being developed for industry such as Adaptive Modeling Language. In
general, the Artificial Intelligence community has been most successful in decision making
when focused on a relatively narrow and domain-specific problem. Few, if any, models exist
for robust automated design decision-making for generalized design problems.
Perhaps the most significant unanswered question in the modeling literature is in regards
to the designer’s objectives. In almost all the examples, the model assumed an objective
function was already given or ignored the concept of objectives altogether; in other words,
the designer had already determined what the “best” design would be in terms of just a
single numerical attribute. Each technique represents more or less a method for searching
and moving through a design space. Most of the models described do not account for
uncertainty and are only concerned with a single attribute, despite the fact that designers
often face multiple objectives and an uncertain future.
2.5 Gaps in the Literature
Based on the analysis of the literature, we can identify several key areas where the extant
research falls short of the motivating requirements:
• Connection with the Design Problem: Much of the outlined literature treats the design
problem as an abstract task. This is especially true with VDT and Design Structure
Matrices; in both these examples the tasks can consume a variable amount of time,
but the outcome of the task is unknown. Since the details of the problem are not
accounted for, we are unable to compare the quality of designs between simulations.
• Appropriate Level of Abstraction: Other areas of research examine design at a level
too detailed for practical simulations. Gero’s prototypes, for example, require very
detailed knowledge of the designer’s process; if one were to implement such a model,
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they would need to develop a large number of prototypes, even for relatively simple
design problems. The quality of the designer’s decision would be highly dependent on
the modeler’s ability to create effective prototypes.
• Capturing Designer Preferences: For the literature that examines the quality of the
resulting design, the preferences and/or objective function of the designer is either
pre-defined or unaccounted for. None of the above examples detail how a designer’s
preferences are developed. Lewis’s game theoretic approach, for example, assumes
arbitrary objective functions in implementations. Much of the empirical research
focuses on the designer’s behavior but does not address what influences specifically
drive his or her behavior.
• Accounting for Uncertainty : A practicing designer must sometimes make decisions
without perfect knowledge of the future and the implications of their decisions. In
almost all the models outlined above, the information available to the designer is
assumed to be deterministic and to perfectly model reality.
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CHAPTER III
MIMICKING ENGINEERING DECISION MAKING
From the literature survey, it is evident that the extant research is largely insufficient in
satisfying all the needs of the simulation outlined in the motivation on page 15. The purpose
of this chapter is to systematically develop a framework for mimicking decisions made in
isolation. The first section of this chapter will outline the decision making framework
along with the necessary models and information required for the simulation. Subsequent
sections will expound on these models: Section 3.2 explores the relevant information needed
about the problem to form a decision; Section 3.3 proposes a particular knowledge model
and illustrates its potential uses; Section 3.4 leverages utility theory to derive a preference
model for a requirements-driven organization. Finally, Section 3.5 synthesizes these models
into a single equation. Chapter will 5 expand the framework to encompass situations in
which a designer is able to make multiple sequential decisions where the result one decision
may influence the next.
3.1 Decision Making Framework
In his book, Fundamentals of Decision Making, George Hazelrigg identifies three elements
shared by all decisions [32]: (1) alternatives, (2) an expectation of the future, and (3) pref-
erences. Fundamentally, the task of this thesis is to develop a framework that incorporates
each of these elements. This thesis will take a modular approach to this problem; each ele-
ment can substituted or refined without affecting the others. The following three sections
will develop each of these elements further and propose a model to represent them. For the
purposes of this thesis, I have redefined Hazelrigg’s three elements as follows:
1. The design problem: Contains the alternatives, incentive structure, relevant design
attributes, and any additional information which the designer can access.
2. The designer’s knowledge: Provides a mapping between the alternatives and the de-
signer’s beliefs about the attributes of each alternative.
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3. The designer’s preferences: Captures the designer’s risk behavior and controls how
he/she manages trade-offs in conflicting objectives.
Representing each of these elements in a computationally tractable manner is the main























Figure 5: Conceptual flowchart of decision making framework
The overall premise of this chapter is represented by the flowchart in Figure 5. The
task of the framework is to transform a set of design alternatives, which I will refer to as
x, into a design decision, π (shown in the figure as the shaded alternative). As Hazelrigg
states, a designer’s choice should be dependent on his or her expectation of the future and
his or her personal preferences. These components comprise the two essential models in
the decision-making framework: the knowledge model and the preference model. As the
flowchart indicates, the purpose of the knowledge model is create a mapping between the
alternatives and the designer’s beliefs about their attributes given the designer’s knowl-
edge. If the designer’s beliefs are uncertain, then the designer assigns a probability to each
outcome, and his or her beliefs are represented by probability distributions; these probabil-
ity distributions are subjective and based on the information and biases in the designer’s
knowledge. Once the beliefs are represented in this probabilistic form, they serve as inputs
to the preference model to obtain the designer’s decision based on the his or her incentives
and values. The output of the preference model is a scalar value for each design alternative.
The designer’s decision, π, is the alternative with the highest value from the preference
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model. I hypothesize that if appropriate models can be developed to represent knowledge
and preferences, then human behavior can be approximated in this manner.
We can summarize this strategy in the equation of subjective expected utility [22]. Given
a set of alternatives, x, each with a set of possible outcomes, y, the decision maker will





where u is the decision maker’s personal utility function and p is a subjective probability of
achieving an outcome based on the designer’s beliefs. From the equation, we can see that
different designers can make different decisions if they have different preferences, u(yi), or
different beliefs about the alternatives, p(yi). In this way, we can model designers on an
individual level by uniquely specifying their personal beliefs and preferences.
Before proceeding, it is important to have a clear understanding of what decision the
designer is actually making. In this chapter, the designer will be making a final design
decision. In other words, after the designer makes his or her decision, he or she irrevocably
allocates resources towards developing the chosen artifact. We could imagine that the design
goes into production after the designer’s decision or proceeds to the next phase of design.
The designer does not anticipate that any changes will be made to the design after his or
her decision. The derivation of sequential decision making in Chapter 5 will more clearly
show why the assumptions in this chapter constrain the framework to only final decisions.
3.2 Design Problem
The first element of any design decision is the design problem itself. In this thesis, I will
assume that the design problem is given to the modeler. As we will see in this chapter, this
assumption greatly simplifies the framework, but also introduces some limitations. Since
the design problem is given to the modeler, I will not develop any “model” of the problem;




The alternatives represent the choices available to the designer. In this chapter, our def-
inition of alternatives will be limited strictly to discrete and continuous design variables.
In the most general form of the framework, the alternative space can be much larger, en-
compassing the set of all possible actions that a designer could perform. However, in the
context of this formulation, performing actions and receiving outcomes strictly applies to
sequential decision making and falls outside the scope of isolated decisions. Therefore, I
will defer a full discussion of alternatives until Section 5.3.
One limitation of this framework is that all the designer’s choices must be predefined.
The designer may choose a design in a rarely explored portion of the design space, but he
or she is still confined to the design space and the parameterization embodied therein. To
borrow Gero’s terminology, this restriction limits the designer to routine and innovative
designs while precluding creative designs.
3.2.2 Design Attributes and Incentives
The designer has preferences for one alternative over another based on the alternatives’ at-
tributes. The relevant attributes and the designer’s preferences are driven by the designer’s
own goals and by the incentive structure of the organization. For example, an engineering
organization often issues requirements for specific design attributes to its design engineers.
The designer is incentivized to meet the requirements, and will therefore prefer alternatives
that meet design requirements over alternatives that do not meet the requirements. Like
the alternatives, attributes could also be indirectly related to the design. For example,
the organization’s management may give the designer a schedule deadline. Meeting the
deadline is typically not considered an intrinsic property of a design, but the deadline may
still influence which alternative the designer chooses. In this chapter, all attributes and
preferences will be driven solely by requirements on the characteristics and performance of




A reality model returns an outcome to a designer in response to an action. This model is
only applicable in the context of sequential decision making introduced in Chapter 5 but
is included here for completeness. This model returns a deterministic outcome for a given
action. For example, if a designer runs an analytical model, the reality model will return the
results of the analysis. If the modeler has a model of the designer’s external environment,
this model can be used to determine the final outcome of the design after multiple decisions.
3.3 Knowledge Model
In the context of this framework, we can view the simulated designers as information proces-
sors: they have information about the design alternatives before beginning the design pro-
cess (their prior knowledge); they obtain knowledge throughout the design process (learning
from models, experts, etc...); and they make design decisions based on the information avail-
able to them. In order to model a human decision maker, the framework requires a knowl-
edge model that can store, retrieve, and make inferences from information. Specifically, a
knowledge model should be capable of:
• Representing the designer’s beliefs including uncertainty : The designer has beliefs
about the relationship between alternatives and attributes based on his or her expe-
rience, education, and resources. These beliefs may be uncertain, especially if the
designer lacks experience with a particular design problem. A designer might be more
certain of one belief than another.
• Inferring the properties of alternatives given information regarding similar alterna-
tives: A designer might not have specific knowledge of a particular design, but may
have knowledge about similar designs. For example, if a designer has analyzed two
airplane designs, one with a wing aspect ratio of 10 and another with an aspect ratio of
9, he will likely estimate that than airplane with an aspect ratio of 9.5 has properties
in between the two analyzed designs, assuming all other properties are the same.
• Updating knowledge in the presence of new information: The design process is typ-
ically a learning process; the designer is constantly receiving and processing new
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information that enables him or her to make a more informed decision. To accurately
model the design process, the knowledge model should be capable of receiving new
information and combining it with prior information to form inferences.
• Storing knowledge obtained from multiple sources: A designer may draw on multiple
resources to obtain information about a design. These could include, among others,
analytical and computational models, prior design experience, and expert opinions. A
model should have the flexibility to store information obtained from these resources
both individually and combined.
In this section, I propose the use of Gaussian process models as a technique for rep-
resenting a designer’s knowledge. Section 3.3.1 will introduce the fundamental concepts
behind Gaussian process models. Section 3.3.2 will customize these models to more ac-
curately represent a designer’s beliefs. Section 3.3.3 will demonstrate how varying forms
of knowledge can be encoded into a Gaussian process model. Finally, Section 3.3.4 will
explore some limitations of the models and explore alternative candidates for representing
knowledge.
3.3.1 Gaussian Process Models
One possible method for storing and learning information is through the use of Gaussian
process models. In the optimization and geostatistics community this method is primarily
known as kriging. However, since this research draws heavily on literature from the statistics
and robotics communities, I will refer to these models as Gaussian process models. Although
there are slight differences between the specific forms of kriging, these terms are generally
interchangeable. Rasmussen and Williams have written a comprehensive book on Gaussian
process models which serves as the primary resource for this section [56].
Rather than encode specific rules and equations of design analysis, Gaussian process
models encode the designer’s knowledge at a higher level of abstraction. When determining
the designer’s decision we are concerned with only two types of beliefs: (1) the designer’s
expectation of how the alternatives relate to the attributes and (2) the designer’s confidence
in his or her expectation.
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The mapping between the alternatives and expectations is dependent on the designer’s
knowledge, available information, and the tools he or she can access. Using Gaussian process
models, we can model different designers with varying levels of “experience”. An expert
designer will have more accurate expectations about the mapping between alternatives and
attributes. Expert designers will also tend to have less uncertainty in their beliefs. Novice
designers will have inaccurate expectations and large uncertainty. A novice designer might
have inaccurate beliefs with low uncertainty, thinking their beliefs to be correct when, in
fact, they are incorrect.
3.3.1.1 Model Basics
A Gaussian process model is a non-parametric, supervised-learning, regression technique.
The goal of this model is to infer the value of a function, f(x), at a set of test points, X,
using a set of training data which I will denote as Xtr and ftr. Unlike many other regression
techniques, Gaussian process models do not return a single value at a test point, but rather
a probability distribution. Since the model assumes a normal (or Gaussian) distribution at















Figure 6: A simple Gaussian process model with four training points
Figure 6 illustrates a basic example of a Gaussian process model. Four training points
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are used to define the model shown as the black rectangles. In between these training
points, the Gaussian process model infers the shape of the function. Each point in the
model is a normal probability distribution; the expected value is shown as the black line
and a 95% confidence interval is shown in the shaded region. In Figure 7 the Gaussian
process in Figure 6 has been rotated, and the normal distributions are drawn explicitly.
Notice that the probability distributions at the training locations collapse to a single point
as the values are known with certainty. In between training points, the uncertainty grows


















Figure 7: Each point in the Gaussian process model is a normal probability distribution
Rasmussen and Williams outline two interpretations of Gaussian process models [56]: the
function-space view and the weight-space view. For this discussion, I will use the function-
space interpretation as it more intuitively aligns with our purpose. Gaussian process models
assume a prior distribution on a (often infinite) set of basis functions. Figure 8 shows
numerous basis functions chosen at random from the infinite set. As in Figure 6, the shaded
gray region represents a 95% confidence interval; in other words, 95% of all basis functions
at any point will lie within the gray region. Any of these functions shown could potentially
be the “true” underlying function. Depending on the prior chosen, certain functions are
assumed to be more likely than others to be the true function. When training points are
added to the model, all functions that do not pass through those particular points are
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eliminated from the set of possible functions. This is done through a Bayesian inference;
if a function does not pass through a training point, the probability of it being the true
function is zero. The probability distribution for the remaining functions is updated via
the Bayesian inference, yielding a probability distribution at each location. In Figure 9,
three training points have been added, and all basis functions that do not pass through the



























Figure 9: All basis functions that do not pass through the training points are eliminated
The function-space interpretation makes a convenient analogy with the knowledge and
information that engineers typically use. Consider an engineer designing the wing of an
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airplane. A designer may not know the precise relationship between aspect ratio and drag,
but the designer probably knows that drag tends to decrease with increasing aspect ratio.
Therefore, any function between these attributes should have a negative slope; we can
eliminate the set of all functions that have positive slope (or consider them highly unlikely),
because a positive slope does not fit the designer’s “training data,” his experience and
education. See Section 3.3.3 for more examples of capturing types of knowledge.
The prior distribution of basis functions is entirely determined by a mean function and
a covariance function. For our purposes, we will assume that the mean is always zero
(this particular instantiation is known as simple kriging). Therefore, in the absence of
any training information, the model would predict each test point to have a mean of zero
and a variance given by the covariance function, k(x, x∗). Loosely speaking, the covariance
function specifies the relationship between the function value of two points based on their x-
coordinate location. In Figure 6, a one-dimensional squared-exponential covariance function
was used:





This function essentially states that the covariance between two points is a function of their
Euclidean distance; the closer the two points, the more strongly correlated the function
values are at those points. σ and θ are referred to as hyperparameters. A general discussion
of hyperparamters and covariance functions is deferred to the next section.
A covariance matrix, K, is formed by determining the covariance between two sets of
points. For example, the (i, j) element of K(X,X∗) is equal the covariance of the ith element
of X and the jth element of X∗. For concise notation the covariance matrix K(X,X∗) will
be written as KX,X∗ , and K(X,X) will simply be written as KX . A full derivation of the
Gaussian process model equations is not contained in this text; however, it can be shown
that any set of test points has the following distribution [56]:
f
∣∣∣X,Xtr,ftr ∼ N (KX,XtrK−1Xtrf , KX −KX,XtrK−1XtrKXtr,X) (3)
If the training points are not known with absolute certainty (such as in physical experiments
34
or robotic sensing applications), a noise parameter, σn, can be included in the formulation:
f
∣∣∣X,Xtr,ftr ∼ N (KX,Xtr(KXtr + σnI)−1f , KX −KX,Xtr(KXtr + σnI)−1KXtr,X) (4)
where σn represents the standard deviation of the function from the training data. In opti-
mization involving computer experiments, this term is often set to zero since the computer
models are deterministic. However, including a small amount of noise at each point can















Figure 10: Learning a new training point
In Figure 10, another training point has been added to the original training set shown
in Figure 6. Gaussian process models are quite flexible to adding information; although this
point falls outside the original 95% confidence interval, the model adjusts to account for it.
Notice that, in certain areas, the uncertainty has grown in the updated model even with
the additional information. Since the new training point was much lower than predicted,
the model has learned to expect the true function to have more variation than it originally
believed.
From the examples shown, we can already see that Gaussian process models meet many
of the requirements outlined at the beginning of this section:
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• Representing the designer’s beliefs including uncertainty : Since the output of a Gaus-
sian process model is a probability distribution, the model is capable of representing
the designer’s subjective beliefs even if those beliefs are uncertain.
• Inferring the properties of alternatives given information regarding similar alterna-
tives: Since Gaussian process models are a regression technique, the model can make
inferences about designer variables for which it may not have explicit information.
Furthermore, the model recognizes that there is uncertainty in its inferences.
• Updating knowledge in the presence of new information: As depicted in Figure 10,
the model can update its beliefs if given new information.
Section 3.3.3 will demonstrate how knowledge can be stored from multiple sources.
3.3.1.2 Covariance Functions
As mentioned above, the covariance function is critical in determining the shape of the
Gaussian process model. Each covariance function has specific properties that make it
well-suited for modeling certain types of underlying functions and poorly suited for others.
The covariance function chosen for a particular application depends on the modeler’s prior
knowledge about the underlying function.
One of the most commonly used covariance functions is the squared exponential covari-
ance function shown earlier in Equation 2. This covariance function is an example of a
stationary covariance function: stationary covariance functions depend solely on the dis-
tance between two points. In other words, they are invariant to translations in the design
space. The most common non-stationary functions use the dot product of the training
points; these functions are invariant to rotations about the origin.
The squared exponential covariance function also assumes a continuous and infinitely
differentiable underlying function. The exponential covariance function, on the other hand,
is a stationary covariance function that allows the slope to be discontinuous.





Figure 11 shows this covariance function used for the same set of training points as in
Figure 6. Notice that the expectation is not smooth and that the uncertainty is much
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Figure 11: Gaussian process with an exponential utility function
In Equations 2 and 5, σ and θ are called hyperparameters. These terms control certain
characteristics of the shape of the Gaussian process model. For the squared exponential
covariance function, θ is a measure of how quickly the function can change and controls
the non-linearity of the function; large values of θ indicate that the underlying function
can have rapid curvature changes. σ sets the maximum possible variance at a point and
controls how rapidly the variance grows. Since these parameters can have a strong influence
on the shape of the Gaussian process model (and the resulting design decisions), we require
a robust method of determining an appropriate value for them.
In the optimization community, a common method for setting hyperparameters is to
maximize marginal likelihood. By maximizing marginal likelihood, we are finding the value
of hyperparameters that best explains the training data. For numerical stability, many
authors recommend maximizing the log likelihood [56], given by the equation below:










where m is the number of training points.
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When selecting a method for setting hyperparameters, the fundamental questions to
ask are, “To what extent does this method replicate the way humans transform information
(training data) into beliefs?” and “To what extent do the value of the hyperparamters
affect the design decision.” Without validating data from a human subjects experiment, any
argument for a particular method would be based largely on speculation. In the examples
shown in this thesis, the value of the hyperparameters were set via maximizing marginal
likelihood. This method was chosen since it naturally forms a balance between fitting
accurately fitting the training data (the first term in Equation 6) and penalizing complexity
(the second term in Equation 6). The method is also easily implemented computationally.
For other methods of fitting hyperparameters, refer to Reference [56].
3.3.2 Beliefs in Extrapolation
When used in optimization, most optimization algorithms recommend a warm start : a
space filling design of experiments to provide the Gaussian process model with training
data [35]. In an actual design scenario, the designer may not have information over the
range of design variables in question, especially at the outset of the design process. This
is especially true when the designer is considering design variables outside a typical range
(such as an turbofan designer developing an engine with a larger bypass ratio than previous
models) or using novel design variables altogether (such as an airframe designer considering
a blended-wing body design). If a designer has information over a subset of the range of
design variables, how does this knowledge influence his or her beliefs over the unknown
range?
The answer to this question depends largely on the designer and the specific situation.
In many cases, the designer may have some general knowledge and intuition, even if he or
she has not dealt with the specific design problem at hand. For example, a aerodynamics
expert knows that increasing the fineness of a Computation Fluid Dynamics (CFD) mesh
will result in a more accurate solution, and the expert can estimate this increase in accuracy.
However, the designer likely knows that this trend will not continue indefinitely; at some

























Figure 12: Designer’s beliefs regarding how CFD error relates to mesh fineness
the reduction in error from using a finer grid. In other words, the designer knows that
the relationship between error and fineness, while initially decreasing, will reverse. Perhaps
the designer’s beliefs can be represented by the plot in Figure 12; the designer has run the
model for a different levels grid fineness and has seen the data converge. However, passed
the dotted line, the designer is inexperienced. He knows that eventually round-off error will
dominate, but does not know the exact shape of the error curve in Figure 12. The dashed
lines show two possible shapes that the underlying function could have; the designer would
consider each of these shapes plausible. In scenarios like the example given, the designer’s
knowledge in extrapolation can be encoded as noisy training data, representing an estimate
of the underlying shape of the function, but with uncertainty regrading the true value of a
function.
Consider, however, the scenario where the designer has absolutely no knowledge of the
trend in extrapolation. Perhaps the relationship between the alternatives and attributes
is a black box, so convoluted that the designer is unable to infer a general underlying
relationship. An example is shown in Figure 13; the designer only knows the points shown
by the squares and is trying to infer the value at x > 3 and x < −4. In this case,
the designer might draw on the Principle of Indifference; when faced with n mutually


















Figure 13: How might a designer extrapolate based on the given points?
in the absence of information to suggest otherwise. However, a designer would not be
indifferent to the numerical value of an attribute; he or she still has knowledge of the
numerical value of the function based on the training points and his or her continuity
assumption. Instead, I hypothesize that the designer would be indifferent of the trend ; it
is possible that the trend continues, but it is also possible that the trend reverses. In the
absence of information, the designer does not know whether the function is increasing or
decreasing. Therefore, in extrapolation, the slope of the expectation should tend towards
zero and the uncertainty in the function value should grow as the designs become further
from the designer’s knowledge. This is represented by the notional plot in Figure 14. The
designer’s knowledge and confidence interval is represented by the shaded region and the
dashed lines represent possible function shapes that the designer would consider plausible.
The designer believes that the function could continue to increase, but the designer also
believes it possible that the function could reverse – or any combination in between.
3.3.2.1 Extrapolation Behavior of Gaussian Process Models
Ideally, we would like to be able to retain the previously described capabilities of Gaussian

















Figure 14: Designer’s beliefs in extrapolation
behavior of most Gaussian process models departs radically from this concept. As stated
earlier, the shape of the Gaussian process model is determined entirely by the training
data, mean function, and covariance function. In many cases, the covariance function
primarily affects the non-linearity of the Gaussian process; the behavior in extrapolation is
more heavily influenced by the mean function. Figure 15 displays several Gaussian process
models, each utilizing identical training information and the squared-exponential utility
function but calculated with a different mean function.
Figure 15a shows a Gaussian process model with an assumed mean of zero. In the
optimization community, this scenario is known as simple kriging. Notice the behavior
of the function in the absence of training data; the mean rapidly returns to zero, and
the variance asymptotically reaches a maximum value. The slope of the expectation does
return to zero, but encountered a rapid trend reversal beforehand. From the perspective
of designer beliefs, the designer has ruled out the possibility that the trend continues to
increase, as shown by the dashed line. This belief would be especially problematic if the
simulated designer were looking for the high value of y;. The designer would expect the
highest value to be around x = 3 and would not look at higher values of x. In contrast,


















































Figure 15: Effect of mean function on extrapolation
values of x.
One strategy for mitigating these problems is to consider alternative mean functions.
Figure 15b displays a Gaussian process model where the mean is assumed to be stationary
and is calculated with a maximum likelihood estimator. Unfortunately, this example suffers
from similar problems as the example if 15a. The designer has ruled out the possibility of
an increasing function, shown by the dashed line.
In universal kriging, the mean function is assumed to be a polynomial. Two examples
are shown in Figure 15c and 15d of a linear and quartic mean, respectively. In the absence
of training data, the Gaussian process follows the mean function, and the covariance tends
towards its maximum value. While these assumptions have fixed some of the problems
seen with simple and ordinary kriging, the have introduced additional inaccuracies. In the
linear example, the designer assumes that the trend continues towards infinity, ignoring
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the possibility shown by the dashed line. The quartic polynomial is perhaps the worst fit,
assuming that the trend sharply decreases towards infinity.
Additional mean and covariance formulations were explored, each with similar problems.
The resulting conclusion is that no combination of mean and covariance function currently
exists that matches all the desired characteristics described in this section. Because of this,
an effort was undertaken to derive a suitable combination with the desired properties. Due
to the underlying mathematical depth of the covariance function, an exhaustive derivation
is located in Appendix A.




















The Gaussian process model is then calculated in the limit as α tends toward infinity.
Therefore, Equation 3 is modified as follows:























Figure 16: Custom covariance function designed for extrapolation
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Figure 16 shows the derived covariance function in Equation 7 for the same training
points in Figure 13. Notice that the resulting Gaussian process model has all the desired
characteristics in extrapolation: the mean of the expectation tends towards zero, the un-
certainty continues to grow as the distance from the training points increases, and the
designer has not ruled out the possibility of the function continuing to increase or reversing
to decrease. Additionally, this covariance function can be used in any number of dimen-
sions and with any number of training points. This covariance function represents a novel
contribution of this thesis.
3.3.3 Transforming Beliefs into Gaussian Processes
This section outlines several methodologies and capabilities for modeling potentially dis-
parate types of knowledge about a design. The goal of this section is to illustrate methods
for building Gaussian process models under a variety of situations. Some of these methods
are further illustrated in the example problems in Chapter 4.
3.3.3.1 Past Experience: Point Designs
Known designs are the simplest information that can be encoded into a Gaussian process
model. If the designer knows the attributes of a design point with certainty, this knowledge
becomes a training point in the Gaussian process model. This data could represent the
designer’s past experience, a model that the designer trusts, or previous design information
that the decision maker can access.
However, the designer does not necessarily need to know the function value at a point
with certainty. In Figure 17, the training points in blue have noisy information, while the
other training points are known with certainty. Notice that the uncertainty at the noisy
locations does not collapse to zero. Noise in the data has two possible interpretations: either















Figure 17: Gaussian process with noisy information
3.3.3.2 Trends: Slope Information
Since a linear transformation of a normal distribution is also a normal distribution, the
derivative of a Gaussian process model is also a Gaussian process model. Solak et al.
[67] derives a method for encoding derivative information into a Gaussian process model.
Training points of slope information are treated exactly like a training point containing
function values. The covariance between a training point with slope information and a











Similarly, the covariance between two training points containing slope information is given













Figure 18 shows a Gaussian process model with both function value information and
slope information. The training points in blue have both sets of information, while the
training point shown in black has only function value information. Notice that, in the
presence of slope information, the uncertainty around the training point is much smaller
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than when slope information is not present. Like the training points with function value
information, the slope training points can contain noise. Therefore, if the designer has an
approximate idea of what the slope is, that information can be encoded into the Gaussian
process model. In this example, all the training points with slope information also have
function value information, but this is not a general requirement; one could generate a















Figure 18: Gaussian process with slope information
Additionally, Riihimäki and Vehtari have developed a method for encoding monotonicity
information into Gaussian process models [57]. To do this, they use training points with
“virtual” slope information. At these points, the probability of a negative slope is either
zero or very small (if the function is assumed to be monotonically increasing). By using
enough virtual points, one can demand this behavior everywhere. This capability has many
practical applications, since many engineering functions are monotonic over their useful
range.
3.3.3.3 Analytic and Computer Models
In addition to having knowledge at specific design points, a designer might also have infor-
mation over a continuous range of design variables. This data may be certain or uncertain.
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Figure 19 represents an example of a low-fidelity design model. The expectation is the value
that the model returns, while the error represents the designer’s uniform uncertainty in the













Figure 19: Low fidelity model represented as a Gaussian process
3.3.3.4 Combinations of Information
Often a designer has multiple sources of information; he or she uses knowledge and past
experience in conjunction with computational models and empirical data. Perhaps the
most useful feature of Gaussian process models is its ability to handle multiple types of
information and make sense of it. In Figure 20a, the designer has three different types
of information: a low-fidelity model with a range from -5 to 2.5, a known design point at
x = −2, and a rough idea of the slope at two locations after the low-fidelity model ends.
The low fidelity model is shown in gray, the known point in blue, and the slope information
in red. Figure 20b shows a single Gaussian process model that was created with this suite
of information. The known data point is able to correct the error in the low-fidelity model.
The slope information guides the designer’s beliefs in the absence of the low-fidelity model.





















Figure 20: Different information combined into a single Gaussian process model
3.3.4 Alternatives Knowledge Models
In some cases, the use of the covariance function derived in Section 3.3.2 would not be
appropriate for a particular simulation. For example, if the designer does not believe the
underlying function to be continuous and smooth, then Equation 7 would be a poor choice
for a covariance function. Fortunately, use of the framework does not rely on any particular
covariance function; the modeler can choose a function which best matches the designer’s
beliefs. Since the designer has a unique Gaussian process model for each attribute, the
modeler can choose different covariance functions for each attribute.
For certain classes of problems, the use of a regression technique itself might not be
appropriate. This is especially true if the attribute in question is discrete. Fortunately,
Gaussian process models can be reformulated for classification problems. Rasmussen and
Williams [56] provide a derivation of this formulation. For brevity, it is not included here.
In general, the framework is not limited to the use of Gaussian process models. Any
machine learning process that meets the requirements outlined at the beginning of this
section would be a sufficient knowledge model. In its simplest form, a knowledge model is
not required and the designer’s beliefs can be represented by static probability distributions.
This strategy is employed in the second example problem in Chapter 6.
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3.4 Preference Model
The final enabling component of the framework is a method of encoding the preferences of
the designer. Since the designer may not always know the exact consequences of his or her
decisions, we require a method of eliciting preferences in the presence of uncertainty. We
also require a method that allows the designer to negotiate trade-offs between preferences,
since the designer is usually concerned with more than one objective.
This framework utilizes multi-attribute utility theory to capture the designer’s prefer-
ences. The remainder of this section will address the methodology for developing a utility
function. The first subsection outlines some fundamentals of utility theory: utility func-
tions, risk, and multi-attribute utility theory. Specific attention is paid to the underlying
assumptions and their validity in our context. The next section documents the derivation
of a requirements-driven utility function: defining the underlying assumptions, forming a
single attribute utility function, and combining multiple functions into a multi-attribute
utility function.
3.4.1 Utility Theory Background and Assumptions
Utility theory is based on von Neumann and Morgenstern’s four axioms regarding prefer-
ences under uncertainty [71]: completeness, transitivity, continuity, and independence. For
brevity the mathematical definition of these axioms is not presented here; a thorough discus-
sion of the axioms of utility theory can be found in Reference [39]. If a decision-maker’s pref-
erences conform to the these axioms, then he or she is said to be von Neumann-Morgenstern
rational ; it should be noted that this definition of rationality is different from definitions
used in other contexts. Rationality is not concerned with what one specifically prefers, but
rather the consistency of their preferences. Preferring cake to ice cream is not irrational;
however, preferring cake to ice cream, ice cream to cookies, and cookies to cake is irrational.
If one’s preferences align with the four axioms, the following theorem can be proved:
There exists a utility function, u, that assigns a real number to each outcome,
such that
A  B iff E[u(A)] > E[u(B)] (11)
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To put Equation 11 in words, the alternative A is strictly preferred to the alternative B if
and only if the expected utility of A is greater than the expected utility of B. This utility
function is unique up to a positive linear transformation.
A simple way to understand utility theory is through the use of lotteries. Figure 21
gives an example of two lotteries. In this document, a lottery will be denoted as a circle
with the name of the lottery inscribed in the circle. Each branch of a lottery contains
an outcome and the probability of that outcome. The square in Figure 21 represents a
decision; in this case, the decision maker must choose lottery A or B. Equation 11 states
that, if the designer conforms to the axioms on utility theory, then every lottery outcome
has a definable expected utility. If the decision maker were indifferent between the two















Figure 21: A decision between two lotteries
How might one determine which lottery has the highest expected utility? This choice
depends entirely on the preferences of the designer. The axioms of utility theory tell us
that we can replace any complicated lottery with an equivalent lottery containing only the
best and worst alternatives. The simple lottery in Figure 22 can assist us with the more
complicated decision in Figure 21. For this simple lottery, the decision maker is given a
choice between lottery C and an outcome with absolute certainty, lottery D. Notice that we
have used the best and worst outcomes from the lotteries in Figure 21 to populate lottery
C. This decision enables us to determine the decision maker’s utility function.
Since utility functions are only unique up to linear transformations, we can arbitrarily
define the utility at two locations. Let us suppose that u($0) = 0 and u($100) = 1. We
can then set the value of y to any number between 0 and 100. The pertinent question for










Figure 22: Eliciting a utility function for money
C and D?” Because we have rescaled our utility function between 0 and 1, whatever value
of p the designer selects is equal to the utility of y. In this manner, we can determine the
utility of $10, $12, and $20, then calculate the expected utility of each of the lotteries in
Figure 21. The lottery with the highest expected utility is the preferred lottery.
In Chapter 1, we identified this framework as a descriptive model of human decision-
making. Since utility theory is typically considered a normative tool in decision making,
is utility theory a valid choice for this model? Perhaps a more fundamental question is,
to what extent do designer’s preferences conform to the the fundamental axioms of utility
theory? Empirical evidence shows large holes in this assumption; interested readers should
consult the Allais paradox [36] and the Ellsberg paradox [19]. Fundamentally, the use of
utility theory in a descriptive model is incorrect; humans do not tend to have consistent
preferences that conform to the four axioms. However, utility theory can still be used as
an approximation to human behavior; while the framework cannot exactly model decisions
humans may make, in many cases it can provide similar decisions. At the same time, utility
theory enables us to capture a variety of preference structures based on multiple incen-
tives. If our ultimate goal is to understand how these incentives and their corresponding
decisions affect the dynamics of a larger organization, this approximation may be sufficient.
Regardless, it should remain clear that this is a fundamental limitation of the framework.
3.4.1.1 Quantifying Risk
The process outlined in the previous subsection for determining utility may seem rather
trivial and unnecessary; one could just calculate the expected value of each lottery and
choose the option with the highest expected value. In practice, however, people often do
not reason in this manner. Consider again the set of lotteries shown in Figure 21. Both
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lotteries have the same expected value of $14. If we chose the lottery solely on expected
value, the decision maker should be indifferent between the two lotteries. However, most
people would select lottery B; lottery B has a 90% chance of making money, while lottery
A only has a 50% chance. Utility theory does not claim that the choice of lottery B is
irrational; it simply implies that utility is not linear with money. Consequently,

















Figure 23: Risk behavior
Figure 23 shows an example of three different utility functions, each with different risk
behavior. Risk averse behavior implies a concave utility function, while risk seeking implies
a convex utility function. We can quantify this behavior using the Arrow-Pratt measure of





Positive quantities of r imply that the decision maker is risk averse, while negative quantities
imply risk-seeking behavior. From Equation 13 and Figure 23 it is clear that curvature in
a utility function determines the risk behavior and has important implications for decision
making. The slope in the denominator of Equation 13 serves to normalize the risk value,
since utility functions are invariant to linear transformations.
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It is important to note that the risk behavior outlined in this section was originally
derived for money; care must be taken when applying these principles to situations of risk
that involve quantities that cannot be expressed monetarily. However, this theory is still
valid for monotonically increasing utility functions [37]. For a discussion of risk with respect
to deceasing or non-monotonic utility functions, see Reference [37].
3.4.1.2 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
Suppose we are in a situation in which we care about more than one attribute, as is often
the case with designers. Eliciting preferences consistently for such a complicated problem
may be difficult. However, suppose we could identify a utility function for each attribute
individually, assuming the other attributes remained unchanged. Is it possible to combine
these utility function into an aggregate utility function that still reflects the designer’s
preferences?
Multi-attribute utility theory deals with the problem of multiple objectives. Since multi-
attribute utility theory is an extensive subject area, this thesis will only cover a few select
topics that are pertinent to our discussion. See Keeney and Raiffa’s comprehensive book
for more information on this subject [37]. For our purposes, creating this combined utility
function is much simpler if we can demonstrate two properties of the designer’s preferences:
mutual preference independence and mutual utility independence.
Preference independence implies that the decision maker’s preference for one outcome
over another is consistent regardless of the other attributes. For example, I tend to prefer
$100 to $10. This preference would be consistent on any day of the week. Therefore, my
preference for money is preferentially independent of the day of the week.
While preferential independence is fairly easy to demonstrate, utility independence can
be far more nuanced. Utility independence states that the utility of an outcome is the same
regardless of the outcome of another attribute (up to a linear transformation). Consider
the two decisions outlined in Figure 24; suppose that our risk averse decision maker is
indifferent between lotteries A and B. Said another way, the utility of $40 on Monday is
equal to 0.6. Now consider lotteries C and D. If the probability, p, that would make the
53
decision maker indifferent between these alternatives is still 0.6, then the decision maker’s
preferences for money are utility independent of the day of the week. Why might p not
equal 0.6? Suppose a decision maker must pay rent on Tuesday and finds that he is $100
short of making the payment. On Monday, the utility of $40 might have been quite high.
On Tuesday, however, the utility of $40 may be quite low, since the designer might take a
riskier option that gives him a chance a making the rent payment. Utility independence























Figure 24: Demonstrating utility independence
If two attributes are mutually utility independent, then the risk behavior, r, of each
individual utility function remains unchanged when combined into a multi-attribute utility
function. Equation 13 implies that the most general form of a multi-attribute utility function
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Therefore, if we can prove mutual utility independence for a set of attributes, then we know
that the multi-attribute utility function must be of the form represented in Equation 14.
The only remaining challenge is to determine the value of the unknown constants, k.
3.4.2 Formulating a Designer Utility Function
The following section documents the derivation of a utility function for a designer faced with
a multivariate and multi-criteria decision in a requirements-driven organization. Implicit in
this formulation are the following assumptions:
• The designer is only given inequality requirements
• The designer is influenced only by his/her incentive to meet the requirements
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• The designer’s preferences remain constant over time
• The designer does not anticipate that the requirements will change
• The designer does not believe that meeting the requirements is impossible
We assume the designer is a given a set of inequality requirements, f∗, for a set of




f∗ − 1 if f is required to be greater than f
∗,
1− ff∗ if f is required to be less than f
∗
(15)
Since f is a function of x, g will also be a function of x. g is a measure of how well a
requirement is met; a requirement is met if g > 0 and unmet if g < 0. When used in
lotteries, g will be shown as a percent.
For the remainder of this section, we will first investigate the form of a utility function
for one requirement only as a function of g. We will then demonstrate that the mutual
preference and utility independence properties from Section 3.4.1.2 appear to be reasonable
assumptions for these decisions. Finally, we will illustrate how to combine individual utility
functions into a unified multi-attribute utility function.
3.4.2.1 Single Requirement Utility Function
Given the assumptions above, we can postulate the form of a utility function. This utility
function is for a single-requirement and is dependent only on how well this single requirement
is met. We are conceptualizing how ui changes with gi as if gi were completely independent
of all gj 6=i. In reality, all values of g are related by the alternatives, x, they represent.
This dependence will be captured in the aggregate multi-criteria utility function, not in the
individual utility functions.
The form of the utility function used in the remainder of this document was constructed
by first postulating the following list of general attributes of a designer’s decision-making
preferences given the assumptions listed at the beginning of this section.
1. A designer will always prefer a higher value of g.
Justification: g is a measure of how well a designer meets the requirements.
For g < 0 this assumption is obvious, since the designer would always prefer
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being closer to meeting a requirement. For g > 0, we suspect this to also be
the case. A designer often prefers to have margin on requirements. Exceeding
a requirement is often increasingly beneficial to the organization; for example,
an organization would always prefer to come in under cost. One might disagree
with this assumption on the basis that exceeding requirements usually implies
additional unwanted costs. Recall, however, that we are examining this require-
ment in isolation, assuming all other requirements remain constant. If a designer
can add margin to a design without incurring additional costs, it is likely that
he/she would prefer to do so.
2. As |g| becomes large, the designer becomes increasingly closer to being indifferent
between alternatives.
Justification: Consider the difference between a design where g = −5% and a
design where g = 0%. A designer would strongly prefer the latter, since it meets
the requirements. The designer would be more indifferent between two designs
with g = 50% and g = 55%. Even though the designs in the two scenarios
have the same ∆g, both designs in the second scenario meet the requirements;
therefore, the designer perceives these designs as being more equivalent than the
other two.
3. When g is near zero, the change in utility with g is higher than at values of g above
zero.
Justification: Suppose the best theoretically-possible design could exceed the
requirement by 20% and the worst design would miss the requirement by 20%.
One might imagine that this is a cost requirement, and the percentages represent









For most people and requirements, the value of p1 in this lottery is likely closer
to 0.5 than it is to 1 or 0. The expected value of the lottery is 0%. If the
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designer were risk neutral the value of p1 would be 35%. However, the designer
would likely be quite worried of coming in 20% over budget, so they might prefer










In this example, the value of p2 is likely closer to 1 than it is to 0.5. The designer
is guaranteed to meet the budget requirement, so the designer would require a
fairly high probability of being under budget in order to take the risk. Now









Once again, the value of p3 is likely very close to 1. Since, the difference between
p3 and p2 is smaller than the difference in p2 and p1 for the same change in g, the
designer is becoming increasingly closer to indifference between the alternatives.
A similar argument can be made for when g approaches -20%.
4. When g is near zero, the change in utility with g is higher than at values of g far
below zero.
Justification: See the justification for (3).
If we accept the premises above, this implies the following properties of the utility function:


















From the properties listed above, we can see that the designer’s utility function is re-
stricted to the class of sigmoid-like curves.1 Specifically, I propose the following function to
approximate the designer’s preferences for meeting a requirement, shown in Figure 25 and










where g∗ and b are designer-specific parameters described in detail below. This function
satisfies all the postulates outlined above and has a convenient analytical form which assists
in simplifying certain computations. It is likely that the shape that best represents a
designer’s preferences is more intricate and nuanced than the simple function shown here.
However, for the examples and demonstrations performed during the research in this thesis,
it was found that Equation 16 was sufficient in demonstrating plausible and reasonable















Figure 25: Requirements based utility function
The utility function in Equation 16 contains two parameters, g∗ and b. These parameters
control the shape of the designer’s utility function and, therefore, can affect the designer’s
1A true sigmoid function is assumed to be differentiable, which may not strictly be true for the designer’s
utility function. Hence, the phrase sigmoid-like is used to imply the general shape of the curve.
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behavior. Mathematically, g∗ is the inflection point in the curve and the value of g at which
u = 0.5. The parameter b represents the distance from g∗ to 73.1% of maximum utility.
From a behavioral perspective, the reader can imagine that g∗ represents the value of g
at which the design is close enough to the requirements that the design is “good enough.”
When combined with other requirements, g∗ is usually the value of g at which the designer
focuses his attention on other requirements that are performing poorly. In conjunction with
g∗, b represents how tolerant the designer is to missing the requirement by small amounts.
I will adopt the terms strict and lax to describe the shape of a particular utility function.
For lax requirements, b is “large” and g∗ is negative. For strict requirements, the value of b
is very small and g∗ is very near zero. In the limit as b→ 0 and g∗ → 0, the utility function












Figure 26: A very strict requirement
A strict requirement implies that the designer receives no reward for that specific re-
quirement if the requirement is missed even slightly (the designer may still receive a reward
for the other requirements). For a lax requirement, a designer will still receive a partial
reward for coming close to the requirement. Strict and lax depend largely on the designer’s
motivation and perception of what management finds acceptable. For example, if an engine
manufacturer has a contract with an airframe manufacture specifying a particular value for
thrust-specific-fuel-consumption (TSFC) at a particular operating condition, the engineers
employed by the engine manufacture will probably view the TSFC requirement as strict;
missing the requirement can have severe consequences for their company. At the same time,
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an engineer working on a specific part may view a weight requirement as lax; if the designer
is slightly overweight, it might not severely affect his reward since the weight of his part
will not contribute significantly to the overall weight of the engine. Note that strict and lax
are not binary designations but represent a continuum of b values.
Using Equation 13, we can analyze the risk behavior of the designer which has been
plotted in Figure 27. The designer is risk averse for values of g > g∗ and risk seeking for
g < g∗. At g = g∗, the designer is risk neutral. This risk behavior for designers in the
context of requirements has been observed by other researchers [16]. The maximum value


















Figure 27: Risk behavior of utility function
3.4.2.2 Combining Utility
Designers are often concerned with more than one requirement. Given the requirement-
based utility function derived above, the goal of this subsection is to determine: (1) under
what conditions can the single-requirement utility function be aggregated into a multi-
attribute utility function and (2) the form of a requirements-driven multi-attribute utility
function.
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For this discussion, we will make the distinction between hard requirements and soft re-
quirements. A hard requirement is critical to the design; failing to meet a hard requirement
would result in a non-functional artifact. A factor of safety requirement on a key structural
member could represent a hard requirement. Soft requirements, while highly desired, may
not critically impact the functionality of the design. Aircraft range might be considered a
soft requirement, since failing to meet a range goal would not impair the aircraft’s basic
ability to fly. This distinction is similar to concepts of hard and soft goals in goal pro-
gramming [47]. A more formal definition of soft and hard requirements will be derived in
this section. Like the parameters in the utility function, whether a requirement is hard or
soft is a subjective question; it depends entirely on the beliefs of the designer. Note that
a requirement being strict or lax has no bearing on whether it is considered hard or soft.
Strictness relates to the shape of the individual requirement’s utility function, while hard
and soft embody the requirements relationship to other requirements.
Preferential independence of requirements-based utility functions is an easy assumption
to justify; a designer will always prefer higher values of gi regardless of the value of gj .
Keep in mind that we are assuming that the value of gj remains constant; any decision that
























Figure 28: Utility independence of requirements
For utility independence, consider the decisions in Figure 28. Suppose that the designer
is indifferent between lotteries A and B; when g2 is 5% the designer is indifferent between
a certain design that misses the requirement by 1%, and a design that has an equal proba-
bility of meeting or missing a requirement by 5%. If the requirements are mutually utility
independent, then the value of p that would make the designer indifferent to lotteries C and
D would remain 0.5. Recall that the choice of p has no bearing on the value of g2; g2 is fixed
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for both lottery C and lottery D. In general, I believe the risk behavior of most engineers
would not change due to independent changes in other attributes, especially if that decision
has no impact on the other attributes.
If we accept the premise of mutual utility independence, the total utility function, utotal,
is multilinear in its most general form. For reasons that will later become clear, we will now
divide the requirements into soft and hard requirements. Without any loss of generality,
we can group the soft requirement utility functions into an aggregate utility function, usoft;
the form of this function will be explored later. Suppose that the designer has n hard
requirements and m soft requirements, the latter having been combined into usoft. The









kijuiuj + ... + k123...nu1u2u3...unun+1 (17)
where un+1 = usoft. To simply the analysis, we will also make an approximation for the
utility function derived earlier: we will consider any met requirement to have a utility of 1
and any unmet requirement to have a utility of 0 (this is equivalent to g∗ and b being very
close to zero).
Consider the scenario in which only the soft goals are met and none of the hard goals
are met. Equation 17 simplifies to
utotal = kn+1 (18)









To determine the value of utility in Equation 18, we must postulate the probability,kn+1,
that would make the designer indifferent between the two lotteries. To give a more direct
example, this is equivalent to asking “What is the utility of an airplane that can neither
takeoff nor land, but can comfortably seat 300 passengers?” For the majority of decision
makers, the value of kn+1 is approximately zero; most people would take any chance that
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could yield a functional airplane over a design that would yield a useless airplane with
certainty. Therefore, kn+1 must equal 0.
Now consider the scenario where only one hard requirement is met and all the remaining
hard requirements are unmet. Once again, the utility function simplifies to
utotal = ki (19)
By similar logic, the utility of this design is very close to zero; an airplane that can takeoff but
not land is equally as useful as the airplane that could neither takeoff nor land. Therefore,
ki must also equal 0.
We can extend this concept and consider the scenario where all requirements are met









Consider the example of an airplane that can theoretically takeoff, land, comfortably seat
300 passengers, but whose fuselage skin would fail under pressurization. As in the previous
examples, I would contend that the utility of this design is also very small, and that we
can assume that it is approximately zero. A designer would still take virtually any chance
of a functioning airplane over an airplane that is known not to function. Making this
an assumption further simplifies the analysis and leads to a more formal definition of a
hard requirement: a requirement is considered “hard” if failing to meet said requirement
results in a design of near-zero utility. Recall that the labeling of a requirement as hard or
soft is up to the judgment of the designer being modeled. A designer may not consider any
requirement to be a hard requirement, while another designer may consider all requirements
to be hard requirements.
If we eliminate all the terms that do not include the utility of every hard requirement,








By constraining the range of the utility function between 0 and 1, we gain an additional


















In practice, the value of kh is likely very high.
While an equation incorporating the hard requirements has been derived, the functional
form for usoft has yet to be addressed. Unfortunately, without information specific to the
design problem, little more can be said about the form of a soft requirement multi-attribute
utility function. With soft requirements, the relation between them is more complex. There
can exist complementary requirements in which the requirements have a net higher utility
when both of them are met than the sum of their utilities when they are met individually. In
its most general form, usoft will be of a multilinear form since the requirements are mutually
utility independent.
Two commonly used utility functions are the additive and multiplicative utility functions.
Both are special cases of the multilinear utility function. The additive utility function is





where kj is the utility of meeting only that requirement. Note that the sum of all kj must
be equal to 1. The additive utility function has the most strict assumptions of all the utility
function forms. If two utility functions are additive, it implies that the designer is indifferent

















Obviously hard requirements cannot be additive since both outcomes in lottery B are useless
to the designer. An additive utility function assumes that none of the requirements are
complimentary; the reward the designer receives for meeting a particular requirement is the
same regardless of whether the other requirements are met.












where k is the value that satisfies the following relation:







Each soft requirement has its own kj which is approximately equal to the utility of only
meeting that requirement. Once again, the particular form is dependent on the perceptions
of how the designer views he will be rewarded; if neither of these equations capture the
designer’s preferences, then the modeler should refer back to the multilinear utility function
and determine the values of the unknown constants through the use of lotteries.
3.4.3 Alternative Utility Function Forms
The utility function represented by Equation 16 was designed to be computationally simple
yet flexible; it satisfies all the requirements outlined in Section 3.4.2.1 and can be adapted
to different designers and requirements by varying the values of g∗ and b. At the same time,
this utility function may not accurately represent a designer’s preferences in all situations.
The utility function that best approximates a designer is likely more complex than the
simple form given and may be highly dependent on the situation.
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Figure 29: Notional utility functions for requirements
Figure 29 shows two notional examples of utility functions that might represent a partic-
ular designer’s preferences. Unlike the utility function in Figure 25, Figure 29a is not rota-
tionally symmetric; The slope is relatively gradual up to g = 0, but then rapidly asymptotes
to 1 after meeting the requirement. This curvature implies that the risk seeking behavior is
not symmetric; the designer is much more risk averse after meeting the requirement than
he or she is risk seeking when not meeting the requirement.
Figure 29b shows a utility function that may be specific to certain classes of require-
ments. The utility function is equal to zero for g < 0, but then discontinuously jumps to a
nominal value at g = 0. From there the designer exhibits risk averse behavior. This partic-
ular utility function could reflect a designer’s preferences for a safety factor requirement. If
the safety factor is below the requirement of 1, then the design has no utility. After meeting
the requirement, the designer prefers high safety factor values, but approaches the problem
from a risk averse perspective.
The modular structure of the framework gives the modeler immense flexibility when
modeling a particular designer. As with the covariance function in the previous section, if
the utility function demonstrated in this document does not accurately reflect the beliefs
of the designer, then the modeler is free to substitute his or her own. As long as the utility
function remains monotonically increasing, the equations derived for the multi-attribute
utility function will still hold, regardless of the particular shape of the single attribute
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utility function.
3.5 Integrating the Elements
In many real world applications, design is an under-determined problem; multiple designs
exists that would satisfy the requirements. Rarely does the design process yield a single,
obvious design point. In other cases, the design problem is over-determined, and no design
exists that simultaneously satisfies all requirements. This presents a challenge when creating
a decision algorithm. If the algorithm is given many feasible designs, it needs a logical
method of choosing one of them. At the same time, if we restricted the designer’s decision
to only the feasible design space, the designer would not be able to make a decision when
no feasible space existed.
Optimization can be viewed as a method of automating a decision. If the designer can
express his preferences in the form of an objective function, he or she can run one of many
optimization algorithms to determine the “best” alternative. Our approach has been to
reformulate the designer’s decision in the form of an optimization problem statement. The
entire decision-making process is replaced with a single, albeit complex, objective function.
Since the optimization problem is unconstrained, all alternatives have an objective function
value; therefore, in the absence of feasible alternatives, the designer is still able to return a
decision.
3.5.1 Expected Utility Maximization
Given a design alternative, the designer’s beliefs about that alternative, and the designer’s














Since the probabilities of each g are calculated in independent Gaussian process models,











u(g1, g2, ..., gn)p(g1|x)p(g2|x)...p(gn|x)dg1dg2...dgn (27)
In reality, the designer may not perceive the probabilities in Equation 27 as independent,
since certain attributes may be correlated. For example, consider a designer who is given
a requirement for aircraft weight and range. The designer knows that if the weight of the
aircraft is heavier than expected, then the range will probably be lower than expected.
Gaussian process models can account for attribute correlations, and the interested reader
is referred to the literature of cokriging.
Equation 27 brings together all three elements of the framework: the alternatives x
and the relevant attributes g; the designer’s knowledge of each alternative in the form of
probabilities; and the designer’s preferences in the form of a utility function.
Since all alternatives have an expected utility, we are able to see not only what the
designer’s best decision is but also how indifferent he is between the alternatives. If the
expected utility of many alternatives is very close, then the designer would be largely indif-
ferent between the alternatives. Additionally, we can examine the different components of
the equation to deduce the designer’s “reasoning” for choosing one alternative over another.
3.5.2 Alternate Forms
The functional form of Equation 27 is computationally troublesome, since no analytical so-
lution exists for the derived utility function form. Furthermore, the expected utility calcula-
tion is a multi-dimensional integral with a dimension for each requirement; if a deterministic
numerical approximation technique is used, then sampling a large multi-dimensional space
can be computationally expensive since the sampling grid grows exponentially.
Fortunately, if Equation 21 is used to model the designer’s preferences, then Equation













See Appendix B for a derivation. The first integral containing usoft can also be further split
into single integrals if multiple soft requirements exist. The particular equation, however,
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depends on the function form of usoft. If usoft is of the multiplicative form of Equation 23,

















(kkju(gs,j) + 1)p(gs,j)dgs,j (29)




kh + (1− kh)us(gs)
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For large amounts of requirements, Equation 28 can drastically reduce the amount of compu-
tation time. Alternatively, a Monte Carlo integration technique can be used as the variance
in the solution is independent of the number of dimensions.
3.5.3 Approximating Exploratory Behavior
Without the sequential decision making technique described later in Chapter 5, the designer
will always make a decision as if it were his final decision. In some cases, however, sequential
decision making behavior can be approximated using only the techniques described in this
chapter. Specifically, we can entice the designer to explore uncertain design alternatives by
changing the lottery formulation.
Suppose a designer is choosing designs to analyze in order to determine the values of
their attributes. One strategy that a designer might choose is to investigate the “best”
alternative (i.e., the alternative with the highest expected utility) first. For a designer with
a heavily discounted utility function, this could be a reasonable approximation. Were the
designer to choose a second design point to analyze, one could adopt the same strategy:
investigate the design with the highest expected utility given the information obtained from
the first analysis. However, in many cases the design analyzed first will continue to have the
highest expected utility even after the new information is available. This is often true due
to the uncertainty in the other alternatives; the risk averse shape of the designer’s utility
function around g = 0 causes the designer to prefer designs will less uncertainty. Were one
69
to adopt this strategy of choosing design points, the designer would analyze the same design
point repeatedly.
In practice, a human designer would never pick to run the same point through an analysis
twice (unless the designer believed the first analysis to be incorrect). The fundamental
discrepancy between the human and simulation lies in the lotteries each is considering.
Recall that the formulation in this chapter is for final decisions. The designer assumes that
he is stuck with whatever he chooses. The designer is looking at his or her situation as if it








The designer has already analyzed Design A, and knows its attributes with certainty, but,
due to the formulation, the designer does not want to analyze Design B due to the possibility
of receiving a design that misses the requirements by 20%.
However, when the designer is exploring, he can always fall back on a previous design
if the one chosen proves to be poor. If Design B did miss the requirements by 20%, the
designer could always choose Design A for his final decision. Therefore, the designer is









Mathematically, we can represent this by altering the form of Equation 25. Suppose that
umax is a previously analyzed alternative with the maximum expected utility. If the design







If the outcome of an analysis does not have zero uncertainty, then the following equation




max(u(µ+ zσ), u(µmax + zσmax))φ(z)dz (32)
where µ is the mean of the distribution of g, σ is the standard deviation, φ is the standard
normal distribution, and z is a dummy variable. These equations state that if an alternative
returns less utility than a point already run, then the designer can still select the previous
design with higher utility.
It is important to note that there are several limitations to this utility function and
many scenarios where this utility function will differ from human behavior. This method
only applies to selecting design alternatives, since actions themselves do not have utility
outside the sequential decision making framework that will be presented in Chapter 5. If
the designer does not analyze the design with highest expected utility first, then the first
decision will be inaccurate. In certain time critical situations with large uncertainty, this





In this chapter, we show two test examples of the decision-making framework described
in the previous chapter: a single-attribute, unidimensional-design-space problem and a
multi-attribute, multidimensional-design-space problem. The purpose of this chapter is to
demonstrate an implementation of the framework and to show how the assumptions made
lead to certain design decisions.
The first example involves a designer choosing the value of a single continuous variable
in order to satisfy one requirement. For this example, we will adopt the perspective of
the designer and will only view the information the designer is aware of. This allows
us to analyze and evaluate the designer’s decisions without any unfair bias. The second
example problem involves the conceptual design of a turbojet engine. The designer can
select values for overall pressure ratio (OPR) and the turbine inlet temperature (T4). The
designer must deal with often conflicting requirements on cost, weight, and thrust-specific
fuel consumption (TSFC). For this example, we will assume an omniscient perspective and
will be able to view “reality” in addition to the designer’s beliefs.
4.1 Single Dimension Decision
Suppose a designer must choose a design variable x such that a design attribute y is greater
than 0.91. Any physical meaning of x and y are purposefully omitted; this allows for a
more objective analysis and prevents us from subconsciously reasoning with any additional
information not available to the designer in our analysis.
4.1.1 Decisions and Results
The designer’s source of knowledge for the decision is a low-fidelity model, shown in Figure
30. Note that Figure 30b is just a zoomed version of Figure 30a. The designer trusts the


























Figure 30: Low fidelity model of y with respect to x
and the model has been validated in that region. For high values of x, the uncertainty in
the model grows. The requirement is shown by the dashed gray line. Note that the de-
signer’s uncertainty about the true function falls below the requirement; from the designer’s
perspective, it would be entirely plausible that the requirement cannot be met.
The designer also possesses a high-fidelity model. However, this model is incredibly
expensive and time consuming to run. We will assume that the designer only has enough
allotted time to run at most two high-fidelity cases before making a final decision. His
task in this example is to choose which high-fidelity cases to run. To simplify the problem,
we will assume that the designer trusts the high-fidelity model to represent reality with
complete accuracy. For the first and last decisions, the standard expected utility formulation
given by Equation 25 is used to calculate the decisions. For the designer’s second decision,
the exploratory approximation from Section 3.5.3 will be used since the designer has the
opportunity to explore the design space.
Figure 31 demonstrates the designer’s first decision and the designer’s rationale behind
the decision. Figure 31a shows the designer’s expected utility at each x. The designer’s
knowledge has been superimposed for reference. The utility function matches our intuition
about the problem. Low values of x have almost no utility, as they do not meet the re-



























Figure 31: Expected utility of each alternative and outcome of decision
requirements based on the information given to him. As the low fidelity model passes below
the requirement, utility drops rapidly. Notice that the utility function never reaches its
maximum of one; the designer is not guaranteed that these designs will meet the require-
ment.
Figure 31b shows the result of the designer’s decision; the designer has run the high
fidelity model which has returned the new information shown by the plus sign in the figure.
To the designer’s dismay, the point he ran does not meet the requirement. However, the


























Figure 32: Expected utility and outcome of second decision
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Figure 32 shows the designer’s second decision. The expected utility is shown by the
black line at the bottom of the figure. The dotted line is the same line, but has been
magnified 10X to show detail. There are two interesting things to note about this plot.
First, the utility function has many local maxima, all of which have very similar expected
utility. This implies that the designer was largely indifferent between multiple options;
specifically to the left and the right of his first decision. Second, the expected utility of
all options is relatively low. This implies both that the designer does not believe it likely
that any value of x will do better than his first decision, and that the designer is largely
indifferent between his options. Slight perturbations to the utility function parameters
could have resulted in a different decision.
Figure 32b shows the result of the designer’s second decision. Notice that the high
fidelity model returned a value outside of the designer’s original beliefs about the model.1


























Figure 33: Expected utility and outcome of third decision
Although the designer’s second decision was a worse design than his first, he can still
use the new information for his final decision. Figure 33 shows the designer’s final decision.
The designer chose a point to the left of his original high-fidelity decision. As we can see in
1Note that “outside the designer’s beliefs” is meant to imply outside the two sigma boundary. Since the
designer’s beliefs are normal distributions, nothing is outside the realm of possibility, but some outcomes
are extremely unlikely.
75
the figure, this design was successful in meeting the requirements.
4.1.2 Analysis of Decisions
Figure 34 shows the true function compared to the designer’s low fidelity model. As the
designer expects, the true function matches the model for low values of x. However, his
beliefs are mistaken at higher values of x; he trusts the model too much. In many regions,

















Figure 34: Comparision of low fidelity model and true function
The first decision occurred largely as one would expect; the low-fidelity analysis in-
formed the designer of where good designs might exist, and he chose the design most likely
(according to the model information) to meet the requirements.
In order to understand the designer’s next decision, we need to understand how his
belief structure updates in response to the new information. The first high fidelity point
returns lower than his expectation, but still within the bounds of plausibility. Figure 35
shows in magenta the designer’s updated belief structure after receiving new information.
For comparison, the designer’s original belief structure is still shown in blue. Notice that the
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uncertainty collapses at the high fidelity point. The uncertainty in the region immediately
surrounding the point has greatly diminished. Notice also that the expectation is now
below the low fidelity model. Overall the designer believes that the low-fidelity model
simply overestimated the original function; recall that the designer does not expect large

















Figure 35: Belief update after outcome of first decision is revealed
To the left and right of his first decision, the designer believes it possible (but rather
unlikely) that a design could meet the requirements. The shape of the Gaussian process
model illustrates why the designer was relatively indifferent to a designs on both sides of
the first decision: he believes that the “optimum” point in the low fidelity model is still the
optimal point in reality.
Once the designer obtains his second piece of information, he realizes the inaccuracy
of his low fidelity model. As can be seen in Figure 36, the designer has to make radical
changes to his belief structure in order to adapt to new information. The designer is able to
seamlessly combine the trusted information at low values of x with the certain information
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Figure 36: Belief update after outcome of second decision is revealed
Overall, I believe this example illustrates the robustness of the framework. Although
he was given poor initial information, the designer was still able to recover and learn from
mistakes. At the same time, each of his decisions was plausible; I believe many people given
similar information would make similar decisions. Obviously this assertion requires further
validation, which will likely require a more thorough visit of the psychology literature for
empirical evidence of how decision makers behave in a similar context.
4.2 Multi-Dimension Decision
For the multidimensional decision problem we will adopt an omniscient perspective, capa-
ble of seeing both reality and the designer’s beliefs simultaneously. This problem will be
conducted three times with varying amounts of initial information given to the designer.
The designer’s preference structure will remain the same for each case. For brevity, we will
analyze only the first case in detail, but the differences in behavior and their underlying
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causes in the other examples will be discussed.
4.2.1 Baseline Designer
This example problem involves the conceptual design of a subsonic turbojet engine. The
designer is tasked with selecting the design overall pressure ratio (OPR) and turbine inlet
temperature (T4) for the engine. The design has three requirements:
1. Thrust Specific Fuel Consumption (TSFC) < 0.9 lbm/lbf/hr
2. Cost < $800,000
3. Weight < 2,400 lbs
The engine is sized for a design thrust of 20,000 lbs. The “reality” models of engine perfor-
mance were created using ENGGEN [24]. Surrogate models were created of these variables
to smooth out any of the noise in the program. The production cost was calculated using
Reference [48].
For this problem, the designer is given the following information:
• A low fidelity model of TSFC which the designer trusts to be accurate to within 5%.
• Weight data from historical designs of past engines. The designer trusts this informa-
tion to be both accurate and reproducible.
• Production cost information from the aforementioned past designs. Since costs tend
to change over time, the designer does not trust this information to be completely
reproducible but trusts it as an estimate within ±5%.
In order to examine sequential decisions and learning, the designer can obtain point
design information after he has made a decision. One can imagine that the designer has
access to a high fidelity model; alternatively, we could imagine that the designer is asking
other engineers to perform an initial design and return performance and cost estimates. We
will assume that obtaining this information is very expensive, and the designer wants to
minimize the number of times he samples a point design.
Figure 37 shows a map of the design space overlayed with both the requirements and
the designer’s multi-attribute utility function. In this example, the designer perceives all




























Figure 37: Designer’s utility function
entire design space, no portion of the design space has zero utility. The actual requirements
are shown as the labeled hatched lines; the overall feasible design space is relatively small.
The optimal design is marked by the white plus sign. Were the designer omniscient of the
entire space, this would be his selection. However, as we will see, the designer only has
rough approximations of the design space, so his choice will be much more difficult.
Figure 38a shows the designer’s low-fidelity model of TSFC. Figure 38b shows the 95%
confidence interval in both dimensions. For ease of interpretation, the confidence interval
is shown as a percentage of expectation. Therefore, for TSFC, the designer trusts the low-
fidelity model nearly uniformly to be accurate to within ±5%. Figure 38c shows the actual
error between reality and the model. While the model is better in some areas than others,
the error stays relatively consistent between 2 and 4%. Therefore, unlike the last model,
the designer’s beliefs about the accuracy of this model are in line with reality.
Figure 39a shows the “true” weight model for the engine (the scale is in 1,000 lbs).
Figure 39b and 39c show the designer’s beliefs about how weight varies with OPR and T4.
The known past designs are indicated by the x’s; note that at these points the uncertainty














































(c) Percent error between model and reality















































(c) Weight uncertainty (% of expectation)

















































(c) Cost uncertainty (% of expectation)
Figure 40: Comparison of beliefs and reality in regards to production cost
model of reality in the region where he knows point designs. However, there are discrep-
ancies, especially in regions outside the three known designs. Specifically, the designer
underestimates the weight at very low T4 and high OPR. The designer also cannot infer
the non-linearities in weight at low OPR and high T4.
Figure 40 shows a comparison of reality and the designer’s beliefs about cost. Notice
that the designer’s uncertainty about his beliefs never decrease to zero, even at the “known”
points. This is due to the designer’s distrust of the cost figures; he believes them to be a
good estimate, but not entirely accurate.
Figure 41 shows the designer’s expected utility for his first decision. For reference, the
actual constraints are still shown, but recall that the designer can not actually see the exact
location of these constraints. The past designs with weight and cost information are marked
with a black x. The designer’s decision is marked by the circle. At the decision point, the
designer’s expected utility of 0.940 indicates a relatively high confidence that this point




























Figure 41: Expected utility of the design space for the designer’s first decision
requirement by 1.1%.
If we compare Figure 41 with Figure 37, we can see that the designer’s beliefs about
reality do not differ drastically from reality itself. The designer’s error generally lies in
estimating the weight requirement; the designer is unable to infer the curvature of the iso-
contour lines seen in Figure 39a. Hence, the region where the designer expects to meet
all requirements is much larger than reality. The designer is able to get very near the
TSFC constraint, because he knows this constraint with the most certainty. Notice that
the designer chooses to stay away from the cost constraint, which is known with the least
certainty. The designer believes that he would still meet the weight requirement in this
















































































Figure 43: Expected utility of the design space for the designer’s second decision
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Since we have incorporated models of “reality”, we can let the designer see the outcome
of his decision and make a different selection. Figure 42 shows the designer’s uncertainty
with respect to each attribute after the first decision. For TSFC in Figure 42a, the Gaussian
process model is able to seamlessly integrate the point-design information with the low-
fidelity model. In the cost model in Figure 42c, the new data point is assumed to be fully
reproducible, so the designer associates zero uncertainty with it.
Figure 43 shows the designer’s second decision. With the new information, he realizes
the error in his beliefs about the true weight function and updates his selection accordingly.
As a result, his new decision meets all the requirements.
4.2.2 Experienced Designer
Figure 44 illustrates the designer’s decision if we add another reference point for the cost and
weight models. As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, the designer’s experience is characterized by
his accuracy in expectations and uncertainty in his beliefs. An additional design point will
give him a more accurate representation of the design space and will reduce his uncertainty



























Figure 44: Expected utility of more experienced designer
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higher T4 value than his previous data points. It is also incredibly useful, since it allows the
designer to base his inferences on interpolation rather than extrapolation. The designer can
make a better decision, since the feasible space is largely within his domain of knowledge. As
the figure indicates, the designer is able to make a decision that meets all the requirements
on his first attempt.
4.2.3 Inexperienced Designer
In this example, one of the designer’s three original data points from the baseline example
has been removed. Figure 45 shows the designer’s belief about the variation in engine weight
across the design space. The lack of information seriously inhibits the designer’s ability to
understand the shape of the design space, especially since the two points he has are nearly on
an iso-weight line. Based on the available information, the designer is unable to determine
if OPR and T4 have any large effects on the weight of the engine. In fact, the designer has



















































(c) Weight uncertainty (% of expectation)
Figure 45: Discrepancy between the inexperienced designer’s beliefs and reality in regards
to engine weight
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cost are not seriously inhibited since the data points are nearly perpendicular to the iso-cost
contour line. The designer also retains the low-fidelity model of TSFC.
Figure 46 shows the designer’s expected utility of each point in the design space. Notice
the striking difference between this figure and the baseline designer’s utility in Figure 41.
For clarity, the designer’s decision has been marked by the arrow. In this figure, the utility
at every point is generally low; no point has an expected utility of above 0.57. This demon-
strates the designer’s general uncertainty in his decision; unlike the previous two scenarios,
at no point does he expect to meet all three requirements. For reference, this particular
designer would have been indifferent between choosing this design, and a design where every
requirement was missed by 1.2% with certainty. The designer would also be indifferent to



























Figure 46: Expected utility of inexperienced designer
By examining the shape of the utility function, we can infer his reasoning for the choice
he made. The designer is fairly confident about TSFC. We can see how the expected utility
has a sharp drop that mirrors the TSFC requirement; the offset is due to the fact the
low fidelity model underestimates the actual TSFC. At both known locations, the designer
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knows the weight is well outside the requirements; the upper right point is 8% overweight
and the lower left point is 18% overweight. Meanwhile, the designer is confident that he
meets the cost requirement at the lower left point and knows that he misses it at the upper
right point.
This puts the designer in conflict as he knows that if he chooses the lower left design
point, he is virtually guaranteed to exceed two of the requirements by a wide margin: TSFC
and cost. However, he is also guaranteed at this point to miss the weight requirement.
Therefore, the designer decides to compromise; he will move away from the certain point
to an area of uncertainty. The designer chooses a direction which he is fairly confident will
still meet cost. It is possible in this region that the weight will get worse. However, the
certain design is so far from meeting the weight requirement that being further away would
not be too detrimental, and the designer is willing to take the risk.
Unfortunately for the designer, he completely misses the feasible space. Like the baseline
designer, we can give this designer the information at the point he chose and see how he


























Figure 47: Expected utility for designer’s second decision and location of second, third, and
fourth decisions
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and the results of his subsequent three decisions. He now has a better understanding of
the variation of attributes with design variables, but the understanding is still weak; the
information he has added is relatively far from the feasible design space. The designer’s
second decision is still outside the requirements. As the figure shows, it takes the designer
a total of four decisions in order to find a feasible design. This behavior demonstrates
the value of information close to the feasible design space. As in real design problems,
the designer’s information needs to be relevant to designs near the requirements if he is to




The formulation outlined in Chapter 3 can be effective for capturing design decisions in
isolation when the outcome of the decision has no bearing on the designer’s future decisions.
When future possibilities are considered, however, the model tends to yield inaccurate
results. Consider the notional two-dimensional design space shown in Figure 48. The
design space is composed of three distinct regions. Most of the design space, shown in
white, is characterized by low expected performance. The dark gray region is characterized
by moderate performance with low uncertainty. Perhaps the designer knows that all hard
requirements in this region will be met, but not all soft requirements. The lighter gray
region is characterized by high uncertainty; it is possible that this region performs better
than dark gray region, but it is also possible that the region performs poorly. If the designer
had to choose the “best” design based solely on the information above, most designers would
choose the dark gray region; the expected utility would be highest in the dark gray region,
significantly lower in the light gray region due to the large uncertainty, and near zero in the







Figure 48: Expected utility fails to capture the best choice for exploration
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Suppose, however, we gave the designer a perfectly accurate model which could sample
the entire design space, and allowed the designer to run the model once at any point in the
space. After receiving the new information from the high fidelity model the designer would
then be asked for his or her final decision. Given the option to obtain new information, how
would the designer choose?
In this scenario, a human designer may choose a design point that is very different from
the region of highest expected utility. If the designer’s uncertainty in the dark gray region
is low enough, and he believes the light gray region might contain a better design, it may
be more helpful to the designer to run the high fidelity model in the light gray (uncertain
region). Were the designer to discover that the light gray region contained better designs
than the dark gray region, the designer would choose a design in the light gray region.
Otherwise, the designer could default back to the dark gray region. Running the high
fidelity model in the dark gray region yields little to no new information; the designer
already has high confidence in his beliefs in this area.
Thus we see a fundamental disconnect between the expected utility formulation and the
reasoning of a human designer. As we will see in Section 5.2, the formulation in Chapter 3
assumes that the designer is making a final decision; there is no mechanism to account for
the possibility of future actions. In this manner, the designer only maximizes the utility of
each step as if it were his last. The goal of this chapter is to extend the expected utility
formulation to account for long-term expected utility. To do this, the expected utility of
actions will be calculated, and the utility function will be altered to account for time and
budget. Section 5.1 will illustrate this next extension with a simple example designed to
show how the underlying equations coincide with the reasoning a designer might use to
make his or her decision. Section 5.2 formalizes the mathematics of the decision process.
Section 5.3 will generalize the concepts of alternatives and attributes, freeing our models
from the confines of simple design variables. Finally, Section 5.4 will address the inclusion
of time in the utility function and proposes some example models.
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5.1 Illustrative Example
We can develop a method for modeling sequential decision making behavior by examining
how one might reason through the example shown in Figure 49. Suppose a designer were
choosing between two designs, A and B. The designer knows with absolute certainty that
Design A misses the requirement slightly. Design B is uncertain and could be significantly
better or worse than Design A. If this were the only information available to the designer, we
would simply calculate the expected utility of each alternative to determine which design the
designer chose. Suppose, however, that the designer was given a third option; the designer
could run a high fidelity model that would tell him or her the attributes of Design B with







Figure 49: Simple decision between two designs
To answer this question, we will transform the decision between designs into a decision
between actions as shown in Figure 50. In this thesis, actions in a decision tree are repre-
sented by diamonds. If the designer chooses Action I, he or she will make a decision without
running the high fidelity model. Under Action II, he or she will run the high fidelity model
and then make a decision. For now, we will assume that the cost of running the high-fidelity
model is negligible. To determine which action the designer will choose, we will calculate
the expected utility of each action.
If the designer performs Action I, he or she will choose the design with the highest
expected utility based on his or her prior knowledge. Therefore, the expected utility of






































Figure 50: Decision between two actions: (I) making a decision and (II) running a high
fidelity model
Which alternative has the highest expected utility depends on the specifics of the designer’s
utility function. For this example, we will not make any assumptions about the functional
form except for monotoncity; this will allow us to generalize the results.
To calculate the expected utility of Action II, we will examine the ends of the decision
tree and propagate the utility backwards. Consider the first possible decision shown after
Action II, labeled Scenario 1; in this scenario, the designer ran the high fidelity model which
determined Design B to exceed the requirements by 5%. Were this to occur, the designer
will obviously choose Design B, regardless of the details of his or her utility function. In the
alternative scenario (labeled Scenario 2), Design B was found to miss the requirement by
10%. In this scenario, the designer will obviously choose Design A. Note that the designer
does not know which of these two scenarios will happen until after he or she runs the high
fidelity model. Therefore, the designer must base the likelihood of these scenarios on his or
her beliefs before deciding between the actions. In the designer’s mind, the likelihood of the
Scenario 1 is simply the likelihood of Design B exceeding the requirement, the probability
p. The utility of Action II can be determined by calculating the utility of the final decision
in each scenario multiplied by the probability of reaching that scenario.
E[u(II)] = pu(5%) + (1− p)u(−2%) (35)
Comparing Equations 34 and 35, it is clear that the expected utility of Action II will
always be larger than the expected utility of Action I for any monotonically increasing utility
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function. In other words, if the cost of running the high fidelity model is negligible to the
designer (i.e. not included in the utility function), then the designer will always choose to
run the high fidelity model. Similarly, if running the high fidelity model were negligible in
terms of cost and time, we would expect a human designer to make the same decision.
If we remove this assumption of negligible model cost, we can examine the conditions
under which the designer would and would not run the model. Suppose that the high fidelity
model takes a very long time to run and that the designer’s preferences are influenced
primarily by this temporal effect. The cost does not strictly have to be temporal, but the




u(−2%, t1), pu(5%, t1) + (1− p)u(−10%, t1)]
)
(36)
E[u(II)] = pu(5%, t2) + (1− p)u(−2%, t2) (37)
If Action I is chosen, the designer will finish sooner at time t1. If the designer chooses
Action II, he or she will have to wait until time t2 to make a final decision where t2 > t1.
For simplicity, we will assume that the effect of waiting until t2 is utility independent from
meeting the requirements and is represented by a factor, γ < 1 (the utility independence
assumption will be more thoroughly examined in Section 5.4):
u(g, t1) = u(g) (38)
u(g, t2) = γu(g, t1) = γu(g) (39)
Combining Equations 36 and 37 with Equations 38 and 39, respectively, we arrive at a more
generalized form of expected utility:
E[u(I)] = max
(
u(−2%), pu(5%) + (1− p)u(−10%)]
)
(40)
E[u(II)] = γpu(5%) + γ(1− p)u(−2%) (41)
Examining these equations, it is now not always true that the utility of Action II is greater
than the utility of Action I. We can identify three parameters that, in conjunction, would
deter the designer from choosing Action II:
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• u(5%)−u(-2%) ≈ 0: If the designer’s preferences for a g = −2% design and a g = 5%
design are similar, then it likely that the designer will choose not to run the high
fidelity model.
• Small values of p: If the possibility of achieving a 5% design is small, then the designer
may prefer not to run the high fidelity model.
• Small values of γ: If the cost of running the high fidelity model is high, the designer
may prefer not to run the model.
Each of these parameters represent a valid concern for the designer; we could imagine a
human designer contemplating the same considerations when making this decision. Note
that the sequential-decision making problem in this example enticed the designer to explore
the design space, even though exploration was not an explicit parameter in the utility
function. Exploration had inherent value to the designer because it assisted the designer in
choosing a better design. This convenient feature allows the framework to retain the simple
utility functions derived in Section 3.4 with only small modifications.
5.2 Calculating the Utility of Actions
Until this chapter, decisions have been viewed in isolation; the current decision was assumed
to have no impact on future decisions, and no future decision could alter the outcome of the
current decision. To look at this another way, the decisions examined have been formulated
in the context of final decisions; the designer returns his or her decision and cannot perform
any actions in the future that would change the final outcome the design. In this chapter, we
will extend the framework to include all decisions. As we will see, this allows the framework
to incorporate new alternatives which the framework was previously unable to model.
The methods described in this section are similar to normative methods developed in
a variety of fields. Like the formulation in this chapter, many of these methods focus on
determining the value of an action or activity. Many of these methods value activities based
on the information they provide. Information Economics, for example, studies how infor-
mation affects economic decisions. Loch and Terwiesch applied the findings of information
economics to the design process [44]. In their paper, several heuristics are developed that
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can guide an engineer’s decision making process based on the cost of information. Browning
et al. examine the value of activities in the product develop process [9]. Their risk value
method assigns a value for an activity based on how the information reduces performance
risk. Most closely related is work by Thompson, Lee and Paredis [69, 41]; decision trees
are used to analyze the trade-offs between the quality of the artifact being designed and
the cost of the design process itself. The formulation in this chapter will also incorporate
decision trees in order to calculate the expected utility of actions.
The sequential decision making process can be generalized by viewing the design process
as a decision tree and back-propagating expected utility. To simplify the analysis and to
leverage the previously outlined models, two assumptions are required:
• The designer is concerned with only the final outcome of the design: The designer is
making decisions based on trying to improve the performance of the final design and
not any intermediate result or reward. If the designer had a performance review in
the middle of a design, this assumption may be inaccurate.
• The time required to decide between a set of actions is much smaller than the time
it takes to perform those actions: In other words, the designer is not making this
decision under any time pressure.
The validity of the former assumption is analyzed in greater detail in Section 7.1.1. For
most design situations the latter assumption is easily defensible.
At each decision, the designer is in an information state, s, which defines all the in-
formation the designer has obtained up until that point. In each state, the designer has
a set of possible actions. These actions are not restricted to selecting a design variable; a
designer can choose to meet with another team, run a computer model, perform an experi-
ment, or any other action that influences his knowledge about the design alternatives. Each
action may lead to one of several possible outcomes. In most cases, the designer does not
know the outcome ahead of time with absolute certainty. This uncertainty is represented
as a probability distribution of outcomes. In other words, there is a probability, P (s, a, s′),
that action a in state s will lead to state s′ Note that we are viewing these probabilities







































Figure 51: Example of several possible decision trees which a designer might consider
of knowledge regarding the outcome is represented by the designer’s subjective probability
distributions.
For every design problem, the designer has a final state which I will define as sreward.
Here the use of reward is synonymous with utility. The designer can enter this state at any
time by selecting a final design. I will refer to this action as the return decision action, or
ard. Based on the first assumption outlined above, expected utility is only calculated when
the designer returns a decision.
Figure 51 shows a notional set of decision trees that a designer might consider.1 In this
figure, states (or decisions) are represented as squares, with actions again being represented
by diamonds. Note that although sreward is represented by a square, no decision is made
in this state. Each state is uniquely defined by the time at which the designer enters the
state, and the information which the designer possesses in that state.
1Note that numerous additional branches and states exist given this set of actions. I have only listed a
few possibilities.
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Since expected utility is calculated when the designer returns a decision, the expected
utility of ard is simply equal to the expected utility given the information in the final state:
E[u(ard)] = E[u(x|s)] (42)
If returning a decision is the only action available for the designer in a given state, then
the expected utility of that state is the expected utility given by Equation 42. For all other







This assumes that the designer will always select the action with the highest expected
utility at each stage of the design process. The expected utility of an action is calculated





P (s, a, s′)E[u(s′)] (44)





P (s, a, s′)E[u(s′)]
)
(45)
The expected utility of actions is calculated in this manner for two reasons: (1) following
this policy leads to logical decisions in regards to performing actions and managing the
designers resources, and (2) this policy provides a clear, mathematically-defined mechanism
for automating the decision process. In regards to the first reason, propagating the possible
outcomes promotes a natural balance between exploration and exploitation. Notice that no
“utility of exploration” parameter was added to the utility function; the designer explores
when it is beneficial to the final design. These calculations also lead the simulated designer
to use resources in a way that mimics human behavior. Given the option of a low fidelity
model and a high fidelity model, the designer typically selects the low fidelity model to
obtain useful information before running an expensive high fidelity model. In regards to
the second reason, this mechanism provides a method of down-selecting a decision from a
(potentially infinite) set of alternatives that is simple to define. In reality, a designer may
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adopt a different strategy for choosing a design, and this strategy may be dependent on
the particular design scenario. In my opinion, the use of this strategy provides a balance
between realism and generalizability; the policy provides reasonable decisions and can be
used for virtually any set of actions and outcomes.
In practice, one computes Equation 45 by propagating the designer’s decision tree and
working backwards. Consider the case where a designer is choosing to run an analysis on
one of three different alternatives: x1, x2, and x3. Suppose that the analysis returns only a
binary result, α or β. We will assume that the designer has enough time to run the analysis
on only one of the alternatives. After the designer receives information from the analysis,
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Figure 52: Two-level decision tree with three alternatives and two possible outcomes
The full listing of his or her possible decisions and outcomes is shown in Figure 52. Using
this example, I will define several terms which I will use to describe different locations in the
decision tree. The decision tree starts at the top of the figure, and the designer can choose
to run the analysis on any one of the design alternatives (shown as the diamonds). When
the designer is making a decision, I will refer to the set of all alternatives and information
states as the alternative space. For the designer’s first decision, there are three alternatives,
each of which has the same information state (the designer has only his prior knowledge,
since no other actions have been performed). For a particular alternative, the analysis can
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return one of two possibilities, α and β (shown as the decision squares). I will refer to
the set of all possible outcomes as the probability space. Note that each probability space
has a parent alternative space. In this example, there are six different possible outcomes
in the probability space. An information state is a unique set of information that the
designer possesses based on his previous actions and the outcomes of those actions. For
example, running an analysis of x3 can lead to information state α3 or β3 depending on
the information the analysis returns. Once the designer has this information, he or she
chooses a final design alternative (shown as the circles). Since the designer is making a
decision of which analysis to run and which design to choose, I will refer to this as a two-
level decision problem where the level is the maximum number of actions that a designer
could sequentially perform.
While Equation 44 and the example in Figure 52 are shown for discrete alternatives and
outcomes, the framework is still effective for continuous alternatives and outcomes. In this




p(s, a, s′)E[u(s′)] (46)
5.3 Generalizations of Alternatives and Attributes
In Section 3.4, utility was defined only in terms of meeting requirements on the attributes
of the design itself. This definition restricted the modeler’s choice of alternatives to design
variables, since only design variables could be related to requirements. In this section, the
set of alternatives will be expanded to encompass the set of all actions that a designer can
perform. The important question for the modeler is: for any given action, what information
is required to accurately model the designer’s preferences for that action?
We can determine the necessary information by examining the equations that lead to a













From the equations we can see that the designer can only be influenced in three ways:
• Changing the designer’s utility function, u(g).
• Changing the probability of reaching a state, P (s, a, s′).
• Changing the designer’s beliefs about the relationship between alternatives and at-
tributes, p(g).
Altering the designer’s utility function is the most rare influence that an action can exert.
The utility function is typically derived from the incentive structure of the organization
which is passed down to the engineer from management. For an action to influence the
utility function, the action would have to interact with the incentive structure in some way.
An example of this would be an engineer requesting more time. If management grants the
engineer an extension, the designer’s temporal utility function has changed.
Actions can also influence the probability of reaching a new state. Consider an engineer
designing an artifact in a large engineering organization. Suppose that the engineer must
obtain approval from his manager on his design ideas before moving forward in the design
process. We can encode this into the framework by including “approved by manager”
as a binary hard requirement in addition to the other performance requirements. In the
designer’s current state, he can perform the action “submit to manager for approval” and
there is a certain probability, P (s, asubmit, sapproved), that the designer will move to the
“approved” state and a (1 − P (s, asubmit, sapproved)) probability that the manager will not
approve the design. The designer knows that the manager is much more likely to approve
the design if he submits a technical drawing instead of a napkin sketch. Therefore, the action
“draft a technical drawing” will increase the probability of moving to approved state. In
other words, the drafting action will increase P (s, asubmit, sapproved). Therefore, actions can
influence the probability of reaching a particular state.
Most often an action will influence the designer’s beliefs about the relationship between
alternatives and requirements. Mathematically, the action is changing the shape of the
probability distribution. Actions will likely influence both the mean and uncertainty of
p(g). However, in most situations, the designer will only be able to specify ahead of time
the change in uncertainty, not the change in mean. Consider the case of running a high
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fidelity model; after the designer runs the model, the designer’s uncertainty about the
relationship between design alternatives and design attributes will decrease (if the designer
trusts the model to be completely accurate, his or her uncertainty will go to zero). It is
also likely that the high fidelity model will return results that are different than designer’s
expectation; this represents a mean shift in the designer’s beliefs. However, the designer
knows only the change in uncertainty ahead of time; the designer does not know what the
high fidelity model will return.
In certain situations, the designer might have an idea of how an action will shift the
mean of a distribution. Consider the scenario in which a designer on Team A works in
tandem with design Team B. Suppose that Design Team B controls a design variable, z,
that influences the performance of Team A’s design; high values of z will have positive
effects on Team A’s design and low values of z could be detrimental to Team A’s design.
Team A knows from past experience that Team B typically picks low values of z, but does
not know with certainty what Team B will choose in this case. If Team A were to meet
with Team B and discuss the effects of z on performance, it is more likely that Team B will
choose a higher value of z. Therefore, the action “meet with Team B” shifts the mean of
Team A’s beliefs to higher values of z. Team A may still be uncertain of what Team B will
decide, but they now believe it to be more likely that Team B will choose a high value of z.
By viewing actions from an information perspective as outlined above, the modeler can
incorporate virtually any action a designer can perform as long as the effect of the action
can be expressed in one of these three ways. Analytic models and experimental tests are
changes in mean and uncertainty. Requests for time extensions are potential changes to the
utility function. Meetings with other engineering teams can result in changes in the mean
and uncertainty of a distribution.
5.4 Design Process Influences on Utility
In Chapter 3, utility was specified only as a function of the attributes of the alternatives.
In this section, I will refer to that utility function as a performance utility function, since
it is based on the performance of the artifact. To account for the designer’s decisions in a
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sequential decision making scenario, the utility function must also depend on the attributes
of the design process itself. Since time and budget are typically the most powerful influences
in any organization, this thesis will focus specifically on these influences.
For designers in an engineering organization, time and resources can have a powerful
effect on people’s decisions. The specific effect of time on behavior depends largely on the
incentive structure and the designer’s perception of what constitutes an acceptable pace.
In many cases, a designer might be faced with a deadline. In other cases, a designer might
not have a specific deadline, and his temporal preferences are based on his own internal
pacing schedule. The resulting conclusion is that a person’s preferences in regards to time
is both very specific to the problem and to the individual. This makes the formulation
of a utility function with the inclusion of temporal influences difficult, and, unlike the
requirements based utility function in Section 3.4, it is unclear whether the utility function
can be summarized in a single specific form. However, the utility of time can still be
examined in a general form, and many useful conclusions can be made. For this reason,
I will propose several forms of a temporal utility function, two of which will be tested in
Chapter 6.
5.4.1 Generalized Form
We will begin the derivation of a time-based utility function by defining a dimensionless
variable, τ , which represents the fraction of time available to the designer to perform actions:
τ = 1− t
t0
(47)
where t0 is any arbitrary unit of time. If the designer is faced with a deadline, t0 is the
amount of time from the beginning of the decision making process to the deadline. In
this manner, τ is equal to 1 at the beginning of the decision-making process, 0 at the
deadline, and can theoretically range to −∞. Note that τ is decreasing with increasing
time. Similarly, we can define a parameter, β which represents the amount of budget
remaining.




where b is the amount of cost incurred at a given time, and b0 is the allotted budget given
to the designer. As with g, I will commonly refer to τ and β in percentages. For most of
this discussion, I will examine utility only as a function of τ . However, all the claims I make
about τ will be equally valid for β.
Recall that utility is only calculated on the last transition when the designer chooses
action ard. This implies that the utility function is valid only after the designer is locked into
a final design. After reaching state sreward, the designer is unable to perform any action that
might change the design. While this might appear to be a subtlety of the framework, this
fact greatly simplifies the formation of a utility function; we need only consider the effects
of time, budget, and design performance at the end of a design, not at any intermediate
time.
An alternative approach would be to define an inter-temporal utility function, one that
is based on the designer’s current state. At each action, the expected utility would be
calculated based on a new utility function for that specific time. This complicates the form
of the utility function, since the assumptions of utility independence are easily violated.
Consider the following example shown in Figure 53; suppose a designer is deciding between
Designs A and B in Scenario 1. Suppose that, at the deadline, the risk-averse designer
is indifferent between the designs. Now consider the scenario in which the designer has a
significant amount of time remaining. The designer might not be indifferent between these
two designs, since the available time might allow the designer to further analyze Design B.
In this scenario an assumption of utility independence between g and τ would not hold.
However, if each of these decisions was a final decision and the designer could take no action
that would provide further information about the two designs, utility independence would
be a reasonable assumption since the designer cannot utilize the remaining time to improve
the design. In other words, the designer’s risk behavior regarding performance would be the
same regardless of the time remaining, since any remaining time cannot be used once the
designer returns his or her design. Therefore, the utility function is a reasonable assumption
for the final transition into sreward.
The above lottery illustrates that performance can be utility independent of time. To use
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Figure 53: Utility independence of time and design performance is only valid if utility is
calculated at the designer’s final decision.
the multilinear utility function, however, mutual utility independence must be shown. In
other words, time must be shown to be utility independent of performance. This assumption
is more difficult to justify; imagine a designer faced with a decision between two actions,
each lasting an uncertain amount of time. If time and performance are utility independent,
then the designer’s choice between actions should be the same regardless of the performance
of the design. The designer’s risk with respect to time may not always be independent of
performance. One could imagine that a particular designer might be more willing to miss
a deadline if he or she knows that the performance of the design is outstanding, and less
likely if the performance is mediocre. However, I believe that this affect of performance
on time is generally small, and that utility independence is a close approximation to a
designer’s behavior. This effect is probably most pronounced at the extremes, i.e. when
the designer is missing multiple important requirements. For more realistic problems where
most requirements are met, the designer’s preference for time is likely very similar for a
nominal range of performance.
If time and design performance are assumed to be mutually utility independent, we can
examine the utility of τ in isolation from g. I will define the utility of time to be the function
uτ . Since a designer prefers to finish sooner than later (for the same design performance,
g), the functional form of uτ is restricted to monotonically increasing functions. Like the
performance utility function, we can arbitrarily define the temporal utility function to be
bounded between 0 and 1. As such, uτ (1) = 1 and uτ (−∞) = 0. Unfortunately, little more
can be said about the nature of uτ without the context of a specific problem. For scenarios
involving deadlines, it is likely that uτ drops significantly across τ = 0; however, this may
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not be the case for all situations. Section 5.4.2 will explore possible functional forms of uτ .
As previously mentioned, τ and g are assumed to be utility independent. Therefore, in
its most general form, the multi-attribute utility function is of a multilinear form:
utotal(g, τ) = kτuτ (τ) + kgug(g) + kτguτ (τ)ug(g) (49)
Equation 49 has three unknown parameters: kτ , kg, and kτg. However, since we can arbi-
trarily define utotal to range from zero to one, only two of these parameters are independent.
Suppose a designer returned a design decision instantaneously, but none of the require-
ments were met. In other words, ug ≈ 0. In this case, utotal simplifies to
utotal(g  0, τ ≈ 1) ≈ kτ (50)








From Equation 50 and the lottery above, it is clear that kτ ≈ 0; the designer would obtain
no benefit from instantaneously picking a design of no value.
Similarly, we can consider the case when all requirements are exceeded, but the designer
has drastically exceeded their allotted time. Equation 49 simplifies to
utotal(g  0, τ  0) ≈ kg (51)








Once again, kg ≈ 0. The design is nearly useless if the designer has to wait forever to
obtain it. The elimination of these terms leaves only the term containing both ug and uτ .
106
Since the utility function is defined between zero and one, kτg = 1. Therefore, Equation 49
simplifies to:
utotal = uτug (52)
5.4.2 Example Utility Models of Time
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the functional form of the utility function is
highly dependent on the individual designer and design situation. Because of this, the class
of temporal utility functions is likely very large, and exploring all possible functional forms
in detail is beyond the scope of this thesis. In this subsection, I will propose functional
forms of two utility functions that are simple to implement and have easily interpretable
meanings. Additional forms will be explored, but are not implemented in this thesis.
Suppose a designer has been given a strict deadline; meeting the deadline is critical to
the designer’s preferences and a design returned after the deadline has zero utility. In the
limit in which the deadline is the only influence on the designer’s temporal preferences (and
not his desire to finish early), the utility function for time becomes.
uτ = H(τ) (53)
where H is the Heaviside step function. Note that this utility function implies that the
designer is indifferent to finishing early. In this situation, we can expect the designer to
always finish at or very near the deadline2; since the actions available to the designer can
only improve his or her final design decision, we can expect him or her to always choose to
perform another action as long as it does not exceed the deadline.
In reality, most designers would prefer to finish the design earlier if finishing early is
not substantively detrimental to the performance of the design. If performing an action
is expected to yield very small amounts of improvement, the designer may decide not to
perform them. In this case, a designer’s preferences could be represented by the following
2Note that this statement assumes the designer has perfect knowledge of how long a task will take. If
there is uncertainty in task length (which, in a realistic scenario, there usually is), then the designer may
finish early to avoid missing a deadline. Even with the Heaviside utility function, it is still possible for a
designer to rationally make decisions that lead to a missed deadline. It is likely that most deadlines are




uτ (τ) = H(τ)γ
(1−τ) (54)
where γ represents the temporal utility at the time of the deadline. This utility function is
displayed in Figure 54 with γ set to 0.9 (note that the x-axis has been reversed to match








Similar to kh, the value γ is likely near one for most designers. Note the similarities between
this utility function and the satisficing paradigm; recall that when a designer satisficies he or
she is more interested in a satisfactory solution than the optimal solution. In the paradigm
of this framework, this behavior arises from the passing of time (τ) and expense of resources
(β) outweighing the expected improvement from continuing the design search. Given the
formulation of the performance utility function outlined in Section 3.4, the designer knows
that most of the utility will be achieved by just meeting all the requirements (a satisfactory
answer). With a discounted temporal utility function such as Equation 54, the designer
will only continue if the cost of the actions is smaller than the expected improvement in
design. Both Equations 53 and 54 are explored in further detail in the demonstrations in
Section 6.3. Discussion of their applicability to modeling human designers is deferred to
that section.
For human designers in most design situations, the temporal utility function is likely
more nuanced and detailed. In many situations, exceeding a deadline by a second, few
hours, or even a few days may not be detrimental to the performance of the artifact. In this
case, the deadline is not represented by the discontinuity of the Heaviside function. Instead,
the slope is likely more gradual with the precise representation specific to the situation and
the risk characteristics of the designer. The solid line in Figure 55 represents a notional
example of this utility function. Note that the utility before the deadline is discounted,












Figure 54: Time utility function for strict deadline with discounting
has an initially gradual but then steep slope. This represents the designer’s tolerance for
exceeding the deadline by small amounts but not large amounts. This utility function was





















Figure 55: Time utility function for strict deadline with discounting
One could also imagine a very conservative designer who highly prefers finishing early
and tends to avoid waiting until the deadline. Perhaps this designer’s utility function is
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represented by the dashed curve in Figure 55. Similar to the solid curve, this curve’s steep
descent begins before the deadline occurs. Mathematically, this is the same function as
Equation 55 with a larger value of τ∗.
In practice, there may even be times when the designer’s utility function is not aligned
with the interests of the organization. In many organizations, an engineer’s time is billed
to a certain project. If the designer finishes his or her work early, he or she may not have
a project to bill his or her hours. This might incentivize the designer to extend the work
up until the deadline. Perhaps the designer’s utility function is shaped like the curve in
Figure 56. Note that this function violates the monotonically increasing assumption made
in Section 5.4, so the lotteries would need to be changed in order to derive the same general











Figure 56: Time utility function misaligned with the interests of the organization
For a given design problem, a modeler can obtain a temporal utility function for a specific
designer using lottery questions in the same way that one would create the performance
utility function in Section 3.4. Once again, the accuracy of the utility functions is dependent
on the human’s ability to specify their preferences using lotteries and maintain consistency
with these preferences in an actual design scenario. In practice, this can be very difficult
for a human, and empirical evidence shows that humans are inconsistent as Section 3.4.1
mentioned. However, one can view these utility functions as an approximation of human
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behavior. If we make a simplifying assumption that the designer will always finish within
the deadline, then Equation 54 may be sufficient to model the human’s behavior. If the
modeler is more interested in the conditions that would cause a designer to miss a deadline,
then Equation 55 is more appropriate. In general, the level of complexity of the utility
function should be consistent with the detail of the behavior being modeled.
5.4.3 Other Influences on Utility and Alternatives
Fundamentally, the designer’s utility function is driven by his or her incentives. In this
thesis, the incentives examined were performance, time, and budget. While these are likely
the strongest and most common influences on a designer’s decision, other influences may
exist.
One potentially strong influence may be a designer’s desire to justify a decision. Since
an engineer is held accountable for their decision, the engineer may see utility in having
information to justify the decision. This could be represented by a utility for reduced
uncertainty; even if a designer knows which uncertain alternative is the “best” from a
performance standpoint, he or she may still desire to reduce the uncertainty in order to
justify the decision to others. This could lead to the appearance of a confirmation bias;
the designer performs the most analysis on the alternative he or she believes to be the
best to raise total utility while disregarding other designs. Note that, given the shape
of the requirements-based utility function, the designer is already incentivized to reduce
uncertainty (he or she is risk-averse). The addition of justification would be an additional
incentive for the designer.
In this thesis, designers are analyzed in isolation. In an engineering organization, how-
ever, designers must also interact with other people. This will likely introduced additional
parameters into the utility function that influence communication. For example, another
design team might request the designer’s assistance; the designer may not see any benefit
(from a design performance standpoint) of assisting the other team. However, from a social
perspective, the designer may still help the other team in order to remain on good terms
with them. These social influences could potentially have large effects on the designer’s
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ultimate decisions.
Finally, the sequential decision making framework was formulated under the premise
that the designer always selects a final design. In reality, the designer always has the un-
spoken option of choosing none of the alternatives. The designer could inform management
that the design is simply not feasible, or the designer could iterate, generating new alterna-
tives and repeating the design process. The designer’s decision depends ultimately on his
or her beliefs about the success of pursing this final option. In its most simple form, this
alternative could be represented by a utility threshold (recall that utility is always defined
between 0 and 1 in this document). If no alternative meets a certain level of utility, then




This purpose of this chapter is to summarize the entire framework and demonstrate how it
can be implemented. Section 6.1 will provide a clear methodology for implementing both the
sequential decision technique in Chapter 5 and the expected utility calculations in Chapter
3. Section 6.2 will address several computational issues that can arise when implementing a
sequential decision making problem. Several techniques will be recommended for mitigating
these problems. The remaining two sections will demonstrate entire framework on two
problems: first, the single dimension problem in Section 4.1 is revisited to show the effect
of the framework on the designer’s decision. Next, a designer is given a set of actions to
choose from in a variable fidelity analysis problem.
6.1 Implementation
Since a description of the framework is developed incrementally in Chapters 3 and 5, this
section is intended to prescribe a concise methodology for implementation. Regardless
of whether or not sequential decision making is used, all steps under “Expected Utility
Calculation” should be performed.
6.1.1 Expected Utility Calculation
Define the Problem
1. Define all design alternatives and requirements.
2. If desired, create a reality model.
Create a Utility Function
3. For each requirement, determine appropriate values of b and g∗ based on the beliefs
of the designer.
4. For each requirement, determine whether the designer views the requirements as hard
or soft. If soft, use lotteries to determine a multilinear utility function. If the set of
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requirements contains both hard and soft, use the lottery on page 64 to determine a
value of kh.
5. Construct a temporal utility function based on the designer’s beliefs about the con-
sequences of going past a deadline. If the modeler can assume that the designer will
never exceed the deadline, Equation 54 might be an adequate utility function. If the
designer would exceed a deadline to improve the design, a utility function similar to
Equation 55 would be more appropriate.
Create a Gaussian Process Model
6. Determine the designer’s prior knowledge regarding the relationship between alterna-
tives and attributes. Represent this knowledge using a probability distribution or a
Gaussian Process model using noisy training points to represent uncertainty. Refer
to Section 3.3.3 for more information on constructing the designer’s beliefs.
7. If Gaussian process models are used, select an appropriate covariance function based
on the designers beliefs about the underlying relationship between alternatives and
attributes. Determine values for the hyperparameters by maximizing marginal likeli-
hood.
6.1.2 Sequential Decision Making
If the designer is making more than one decision, complete the following steps. If the
designer is making only a final decision, perform only step 11.
8. Define all possible actions that a designer can perform.
9. Determine how each action will influence the designer’s knowledge. Recall from Sec-
tion 5.3 that an action can only affect the utility function, probability of reaching a
state, and/or beliefs about the attributes of alternatives.
10. Given the set of actions, build a decision tree to determine the information states
that the designer can reach. If continuous alternatives or outcomes are used, then the
alternative space and probability space need to be discretized; determine the fineness
of sampling for the alternative space and the probability space.
11. At sreward of each branch of the decision tree, use Equation 28 on page 68 to calculate
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the expected utility of each alternative.
12. Working backward through the decision tree, use Equation 45 on page 98 in each
probability space to calculate the expected utility in the parent alternative space. In
each alternative space, select the maximum expected utility to feed into the parent
probability space.
13. Repeat step 12 until you reach the beginning of the decision tree (the point furthest
from sreward. At this level, an expected utility is calculated each action. The designer
chooses the action with the maximum expected utility.
14. If a reality model exists, use the outcome from the reality model to determine the
designer’s next decisions.
6.2 Computational Issues
The greatest challenge of the sequential decision making technique outlined in the previous
chapter is the computational effort required. A good estimate of the length of time to
perform the calculation is to find the number of expected utility calculations; in practice,
it was found that the majority of the computational effort was in numerically integrating
Equation 28. Consider again the decision tree shown in Figure 52. For three alternatives
each with two possible outcomes, we are required to perform eighteen expected utility
calculations (three alternatives and six information states).1 Were we to add the possibility
of running a second analysis before making a decision to the previous example, the number
of expected utility calculations increases by a factor of four (assuming the designer does
not choose to run an analysis on the same alternative twice). A three level problem with
four alternatives and three outcomes requires 432 expected utility calculations. From this
example, it is evident that adding levels, alternatives, and outcomes can quickly increase
the amount of expected utility by orders of magnitude.
In a continuous space, this is problem is even more pronounced. The inclusion of the
max operator in Equation 45 precludes the possibility of finding an analytical solution for
1One might recognize that some of the expected utility calculations are the same and need not be repeated.
In this case however, it is possible that all states are unique. For example, if running an analysis on x1
provides the designer with some tangential information regarding x2 and x3, then all the calculations in the
final alternative space might be unique.
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all but trivial problems. In practice, Equation 46 is solved numerically by dividing the
alternatives and outcomes into discrete possibilities. For realistic problems, this can require
enormous computational effort if a fine mesh of the alternative and probability space is
used. In general, computation increases in polynomial time with number of alternatives
and possibilities and exponential time with number of levels. Equation 56 provides an
estimate of the number of expected utility calculations required for a given problem with
continuous design variables and outcomes:
Expected Utility Calculations = xnlpr(l−1) (56)
where x is the discretization of the design space for each design variable, n is the number of
design variables, l is the number of decision levels, p is the discretization of the probability
space for each requirement, and r is the number of requirements. To give an example of
the computational difficulty, a simple design problem with one continuous design variable
and two continuous requirements analyzed at three levels with both the alternative and
probability space discretized to 50 points requires about 780 billion expected utility cal-
culations. For large values of any variable in Equation 56, the number of calculations can
quickly become unmanageable. The goal of this section is to outline several strategies for
minimizing the computational effort.
6.2.1 Adaptive Sampling2
For continuous probability spaces, finely sampling the entire space of outcomes can be
computationally intractable. Luckily, in many scenarios, the variability in expected utility
across the probability space is generally very small as the space divides into distinct clusters.
Figure 57 shows an example of this phenomena; the x and y axes show the outcome of a
running an analysis on a particular design for two attributes. Movement along each axis
shows the deviation from the designer’s expectation for each attribute in units of standard
deviation. In other words, at the point(0,0) the analysis returns values for each attribute
that perfectly match the designer’s expectation. At (1,-2) the analysis returned a value for
2This section was developed with substantial assistance from Dr. Matt Daskilewicz who
recommended and programmed an adaptive sampling algorithm for this research.
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attribute 1 that was one standard deviation above what the designer expected and a value
for attribute 2 that was two standard deviations below what the designer expected. Notice
the two distinct regions in the probability space; most of the design space has constant
utility, and only a small region in the upper right corner has any variability. In order to

































Figure 57: Expected utility variation for a notional probability space with two requirements
This phenomena has two causes: (1) the max operator in Equation 45 and (2) the
localized effect of learning. For many actions, the outcome of the action will not affect
the maximum expected utility. For example, suppose a designer is analyzing a design at a
particular value of a design variable, x = 1. If this is far from the optimum value of the
design variable, information obtained about the design at x = 1 will not have a significant
influence on the attribute value at the optimum. Hence, the expected utility remains largely
unchanged.
We can take advantage of this feature by only sampling areas of the probability space



































Figure 58: Coarse mesh of probability space
1. Sample the probability space with a course distribution of points, as shown by the
white circles in Figure 58.
2. For each square of samples, refine the mesh if any variation exists within the square
(i.e., if all vertices are not identical). In this case, the squares in Figure 59 represent
a finer sampling where variation occurs.
3. Repeat step 2 for a pre-specified number of refinement levels. The triangles in Figure
59 represent a second level of refinement.
In the example shown, we were able to achieve a sampling equivalent to 13 sample in each
dimension (169 total samples) using only 52 samples. Further savings could be achieved by
using a more sophisticated adaptive sampling algorithm.
6.2.2 Elimination of Dominated Alternatives
When considering temporal effects, there are many times when stopping criteria can be
determined without evaluating the remainder of a decision tree. One can compare the
utility of choosing action ard to another action by comparing the expected utility of ard to


































Figure 59: Refined adaptive mesh of probability space
example: A designer is at time step t1. Suppose that if the designer were to return a
decision at t1, his maximum expected value of ug would equal 0.9 and uτ would equal 0.95,
resulting in a total expected utility of 0.855. At time step t2, uτ would equal 0.8 based
on his temporal utility function. Therefore, without calculating ug for any other action, it
is clear that ard would be the optimal decision since no value of ug at t2 could overcome
the decrease in uτ . This observation is especially useful near a deadline, where uτ tends to
decrease rapidly.
6.2.3 Eliminating Duplicate Information State and Expected Utility Calcula-
tions
When two actions are performed whose outcomes are not dependent on each other, the
probability of reaching a particular information state is the same regardless of the order
that the actions were performed. For example, consider a designer faced with two design
alternatives, A and B, shown by the decision tree in Figure 60. For the designer’s first
action, he could choose to (1) analyze Design A, (2) analyze Design B, or (3) return a
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Figure 60: Duplicate information state and expected utility calculations
can (1) analyze the other design or (2) return a decision for his second action. Since the
order that designs were analyzed has no bearing on the probabilities of their outcomes, the
information states with the same color are identical. The expected utility calculations and
the designer’s decision in both situations would be identical. In Figure 60, the identical
information states have the same color. Therefore, the expected utility at any orange
information state is the same; these calculations need not be performed twice.
If the designer does not learn anything about Design A from analyzing Design B and
vice versa, then the problem in Figure 60 can be simplified further by eliminating duplicate
expected utility calculations. The expected utility calculations (which occur at the circles
in the decision tree) have been shaded in the figure to show identical calculations. If every
end of the decision tree were calculated, a total of 24 would be required; by eliminating
duplicates, only 6 need to be performed.
Note that this simplification cannot always be performed. To borrow the example from
Section 5.3, the actions “create technical drawing of design idea” and “submit design idea
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to manager” are not independent. Creating the technical drawing and submitting it to
the manager has a different probability distribution of outcomes than submitting a napkin
sketch to the manager and then creating a technical drawing.
6.3 Investigations of Time
The first experiment was designed to fulfill three goals: (1) demonstrate the methods for-
mulated in Chapters 3 and 5, (2) explore the effects of the temporal utility function on
the designer’s decision making behavior, and (3) compare the results of the sequential deci-
sion making algorithm to the approximation derived in Section 3.5.3 and demonstrated in
Section 4.1.
Recall that, in this example, the designer is choosing a value of x such that y is greater
than 0.91. The designer has been given a low fidelity model, shown again in Figure 61. The
designer can run a high fidelity model at three different locations before making a decision.
x
y








Figure 61: Designer beliefs based on low fidelity model
In this example, we will explore the effect of various temporal utility functions on the
designer’s behavior. Specifically we will calculate the expected utility of each alternative
using Equation 54 with varying values for γ. As in Section 4.1, the designer’s performance
utility function follows the form of Equation 16 with g∗ = −0.02 and b = 0.03. Since
the designer is only concerned with one requirement, the concept of “hard” and “soft” are
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Figure 62: Expected utility of x if the designer was given only one decision
For comparison, Figure 62 shows the expected utility of each alternative if the designer
could not run a high fidelity model and had to make a decision based solely on the low fidelity
model. This is calculated using only the formulations in Chapter 3 and not including any of
the sequential decision making formulations in Chapter 5. The result of this calculation is
largely as expected; utility is highest in the region most likely to meet the requirement and
near zero everywhere else. Were the designer to choose a design based on the low fidelity
model, he would pick the peak of the low fidelity model.
In terms of the sequential decision making, this example problem is a 3-level problem.
Since both the design variables and attributes are continuous, both the alternative space
and probability space were discretized into 50 points. Through experimenting with different
size grids, it was found that this level of accuracy filtered out almost all the numerical noise
in the curves. However, accurate results can still be obtained in this problem with half the
grid size.
Figure 63 shows the designer’s first decision using the sequential decision making con-
struct for various values of γ. The expected utility from Section 4.1 is represented by the
dashed line. Perhaps the most striking feature of 63 is that all of the expected utility curves
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Figure 63: Expected utility of x for different values of γ
appear to be flat. This represents a general indifference by the designer between alterna-
tives; each of them is approximately as good as the others. In Figure 64, we have zoomed
in on the top four curves. The dotted line shows the maximum expected utility of the
alternatives using the method from Chapter 3. We can interpret the line as a boundary for
continuing the design search; if the expected utility of any curve falls below this dashed line,
the designer would prefer to make a decision rather than run the model. We can see that the
temporal utility function cannot be significantly discounted if the designer is going to run
an analysis. This, however, is consistent with the nature of the problem; the designer has
relatively narrow uncertainty bands about his beliefs. The low fidelity model indicates that
he will achieve high expected utility. Therefore, the designer has little incentive to search.
Were his uncertainty greater, he would likely be more inclined to search for a solution.
The designer’s preferred value x to run in the analysis has been marked by the circles
in Figure 64. Notice that the designer does not pick the optimum of the low fidelity model.
Instead, the designer prefers very high x where the designer has the most uncertainty. This
is a departure from the example in Chapter 4. In the sequential decision making algorithm,
the designer is trying to pick the point that maximizes his information. By choosing a
point all the way to the right, the designer can obtain a better sense of the true shape of
the curve.
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One might notice that the variation of the curves is very small. In fact, the expected
utility of the most preferred and the least preferred differ only by about 0.005. The reader
might interpret this to mean that the designer thinks that running points at low values of x
is very beneficial, but this interpretation is incorrect. Instead, it implies that the designer
does not think that running multiple points in general is beneficial. If the designer’s prior
beliefs are correct (recall from Chapter 4 that they are not), then the designer has little to
gain from sampling the design space; his uncertainty is already very small and his utility
function is lax. The designer in the next example has much greater uncertainty, and the
differences in utility are more pronounced.
Finally, the demonstration shown here offers a glimpse of a way in which the framework
can improve. The lowest curve in Figure 64 has a pronounced and curious shape. The
optimal design point in the low fidelity model is a local minimum in expected utility with
sequential decision making. When testing the sequential decision making algorithm on
multiple test problems, this was a common occurrence; the point with the highest expected
utility using the framework in Chapter 3 had the lowest expected utility using sequential
decision making. Much of this phenomena can be attributed to the learning model; if the
designer runs the high fidelity model on the “best” point and the design turns out to be
poor, the designer expects the designs to be poor everywhere. However, if the designer















Figure 64: Shape of expected utility curves
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runs an analysis to the left or the right of the best point and it turns out to be poor, the
designer expects that the “best” point has not changed significantly. The knowledge model
fails to capture the changes in beliefs of human beings. This behavior can be attributed to
the noise in Equation 4. Even if the designer receives data that proves that his uncertainty
estimation is wrong, the noise in the model currently does not update to reflect this. One
potential solution is to treat the noise as a hyperparamter [56]. Then, when maximizing
marginal likelihood, the noise should update to reflect the designer’s increased uncertainty.
6.4 Strategy in Variable Fidelity Analysis
The second demonstration is designed to illustrate the framework’s capability to develop a
strategy for the designer. By strategy, I mean a decision for any given information state.
Unlike the previous demonstration, this problem contains no model of “reality;” we are
more interested in determining how different realities change the behavior of the designer.
In this design problem, the designer is faced with three alternatives which I will label
A, B, and C. The designer is also given two requirements: both y1 and y2 must be above
1. We will assume that Requirement 1 is a soft requirement, and Requirement 2 is a hard
requirement (kh = 0.8). In other words, the designer should be more concerned with meeting
Requirement 2 than Requirement 1. Both requirements are strict (g∗ = 0, b = 0.5%).
The designer has varying levels of prior knowledge about the each of the alternatives; this
knowledge is represented as normal probability distributions for each attribute. Table 1
shows the mean and standard deviation of each requirement. From a qualitative perspective,
the simulated designer knows the least about Design A. The designer suspects that Design
B meets Requirement 1, and that Design C meets Requirement 2. Were the designer to
make a decision based on his prior knowledge, he would choose Design C which has an
expected utility of 0.650. Note that Design C is the most attractive since it is the most
likely to meet the hard requirement. For reference, Design A has an expected utility of
0.433, and Design B has an expected utility of 0.213.
The designer has at his disposal both a low fidelity and a high fidelity model of the
relationship between each alternative and the requirements. Running the low fidelity model
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Table 1: Designer’s prior beliefs regarding the design alternatives
Requirement 1 Requirement 2
E[y1] σ(y1) E[y2] σ(y2) E[u(x)]
A 0.90 0.30 1.00 0.30 0.433
B 1.10 0.15 0.85 0.20 0.213
C 0.90 0.15 1.15 0.20 0.650
costs the designer 15τ . The designer can run only one alternative through the low fidelity
model at a time, but this model returns an estimate for both requirements. One might
imagine that the low fidelity is similar to the aerospace software tool Flight Optimization
System (FLOPS) which returns a estimate for many design attributes in short amount of
time. We will assume that the designer believes the standard deviation of this model to be
0.1, and that this standard deviation remains constant regardless of the value the model
returns. Each run of the high fidelity model costs the designer 13τ . Unlike the low fidelity
model, this model returns a value for only one requirement. This is similar to a CFD or
an FEA model which will return only the aerodynamic loads or the structural responses,
respectively. The designer trusts the high fidelity model to be perfectly accurate.
Additionally, we will assume that the alternatives are so different that obtaining infor-
mation about one gives no information about another. In other words, the designer does
not learn anything about one alternative based on the properties of another. In regards to
the models, we will assume that results from a high fidelity model will not influence the
designer’s trust in future runs of a low fidelity model. For example, if the high fidelity model
returns a value that was significantly different from the low fidelity model, the designer will
continue to believe the standard deviation of the low fidelity model to be 0.1. In other
words, the designer suspects this inconsistency to be an outlier. Finally, we will assume
that the designer has perfect knowledge of how long each analysis will take. It is impor-
tant to note that these are simplifying assumptions intended to reduce the computational
complexity and not limitations to the framework. Each of these details and nuances could
be captured in the model. However, as we will see in the demonstration, the framework
provides reasonable designer behavior even when these simplifying assumptions are made.
Equation 54 was used to model the designer’s preferences for time. It is assumed that
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the deadline given to the designer is very strict, implying no utility for τ < 0. A discount
factor of γ = 0.9 was used in Equation 54. Per the assumptions in Section 5.4.1, it is
assumed that the time of making a decision is negligible compared to the time to run the
models.
6.4.1 Implementation of Demonstration Problem
This demonstration is an example in which some of the strategies outlined in Section 6.2
can be used to minimize the computational load of calculating the expected utility of each
alternative. The simplicity comes from the lack of unique information sets. The information
state is defined by the actions of the designer and the results of those actions. In this case,
however, the order of the actions does not influence the probability of a particular outcome.
From an information state perspective, running the low fidelity on model on Design A
and then B is identical to running the model on Design B and then A. The information
obtained from Design A will not influence the information obtained from Design B. In this
way, the overall number of expected utility calculations is relatively low. In addition, some
information states are obviously poor choices; for example, if the designer ran a high fidelity
model on both requirements for one design, he would not run a low fidelity afterwards; doing
so would provide the designer with no new information. Therefore, we can eliminate sets
of actions that would obviously return poor expected utility.
In the implementation, the expected utility was calculated for each unique information
state. The maximum expected utility of the alternatives from each information state was
then stored in memory. The algorithm then expanded the decision tree, found an identical
information state in memory, and used the stored expected utility in its calculation. In
this way, the most computationally expensive operation, calculating expected utility, is
performed the minimum number of times possible.
The temporal utility function also played a role in simplifying the computation. Since
the future is discounted, there are many instances in which the simulation can determine
that returning a decision will be better than continuing without calculating the expected




Figure 65 displays the expected utility of each possible alternative. From the graph, we can
see some general trends that would likely be consistent with a human designer’s reasoning.
The observation that is perhaps the most obvious to the designer is that making a decision
without running a model is the least attractive alternative. This is to be expected, since
the designer has great uncertainty in his prior knowledge. A designer would find it more
beneficial to obtain information at the cost of time, than to make a poor decision instantly.
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Figure 65: Expected utility for each alternative available to the designer
In general, the designer found running a low fidelity model to be more beneficial than
a high fidelity model. In the design process, engineers often follow the same practice of
using low fidelity models to learn which alternatives are worth investigating and which
alternatives are inadequate. At the same time, running a high fidelity model on y2 is very
close in expected utility to running a low fidelity model. This can be attributed to y2
being a hard requirement; the designer can obtain almost 80% of his utility be just meeting
y2. However, analyzing Design C has the lowest expected utility of the three alternatives;
Design C has a 77% chance of meeting Requirement 2, so the designer does not want to
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spend a third of his time confirming something he already believes to be true. As one
would expect, running a high fidelity model on y1 has the lowest utility of all the analyses.
Even if a design meets Requirement 1, this information is virtually useless unless the design
also meets Requirement 2. Design C is a slight exception to this rule; in this case, the
designer already has some confidence that Design C meets Requirement 2, so investigating
Requirement 2 first is not a waste of time.
In the end, the designer decides to analyze Design A with the low fidelity model. Of all
the design alternatives, the designer has the least information about Design A. Recall that
Design A has a 50% chance of meeting Requirement 1, so running a low fidelity model will
allow the designer to determine if Design A is on par with Design C and worth pursuing.
Since the algorithm considers all outcomes of a designer’s decision in order to calculate
the expected utility, we can examine the designer’s second decision based on the information
received from analyzing Design A with the low fidelity model. Figure 66 displays the
designer’s second decision as a function of the outcome of the low fidelity model for both
y1 and y2
3. If the designer finds that y2 of Design A is less than 1, the designer further
analyzes Design C to confirm that y2 does in fact meet the requirement; the designer has
eliminated Design A as a potential candidate, and focuses his attention on the design most
likely to meet the requirements.
If y2 of design A is greater than 1, the designer’s decision depends on the value of y1.
If y1 does not meet the requirements, the designer chooses to run the low fidelity model on
Design C to get an estimate of both attributes. This will allow the designer to compare
Design A and C to better compare the designs. If y1 is greater than 1 and y2 is slightly
greater than 1, the designer will run a high fidelity model on Design A’s y1 to confirm that
the design does meet the requirements. If the low fidelity model returns a value of y1 that
is near 1, the designer will run a high fidelity model on that attribute. If however, both
attributes exceed the requirements, the designer will simply pick Design A. Since his utility
function is discounted, the designer decides to stop early since he has high confidence that
3The actual division of decisions does not fall into perfect rectangles. The sampling of this probability
space was fairly sparse; therefore, the exact boundaries are difficult to ascertain from the data.
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Figure 66: Designer’s second decision based on the outcome of the low fidelity model
Design A meets both requirements.
Extending this idea, we can map out the designer’s strategy for any possibility set of
actions and outcomes independent of a single reality. The independence from a particular
reality is a powerful tool of the sequential decision making method; it allows to consider
a large set of realities and examine the conditions in which the designer would make poor
decisions. For example, were the utility of time function formulated differently, we could
examine the conditions under which the designer would go over the deadline. Note that
this ability is contingent on two conditions: (1) that the designer considered the reality a
possibility and (2) that the probability space is small enough to be stored on the computer.
If reality procures an outcome which was outside the designer’s realm of plausibility, then
the next decision would have to be recalculated with the new information.
In this example, the framework was found to give reasonable results for formulating a
strategy in variable fidelity analysis. The designer begins by running a low fidelity model to
inexpensively obtain information about a highly unknown alternative. The designer then
130
uses the information to inform his next decision; running high fidelity models when he
need more accurate information, and running low fidelity models when he needs a quick
comparison.
At the same time, it is likely that many people would have made a different decision
than the simulated designer. Some of this discrepancy can be explained by the parameters
used in the utility function (g∗, b, γ). For any particular person, the parameters used
in example may be very different than the parameters that best match the individual’s
preferences. Furthermore the differences in expected utility for the first decision are very
small; in fact, the differences are very close to the numerical precision of the model and
running the same scenario with less precision in the probability space can return a different
decision. In an informal poll of several engineers, I received many different responses of
first decisions. While not scientifically rigorous, this poll provides evidence that there are
many “good” responses to this problem. The simulated designer would agree with that
assessment, acknowledging that he is nearly indifferent to many possible alternatives. For




As mentioned in Chapter 1, the goal of this framework is to computationally model the
decisions made by human designers. While the framework has been demonstrated on sev-
eral examples, these results have only been compared to intuition and reasoning; a formal
experiment comparing human decision making to the simulated decision making has not
been performed. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: (1) to explore the limitations and
weaknesses of the framework in the context of its ability to replicate human decision making
and (2) to explore import considerations for designing experiments to validate, invalidate,
or improve the model.
7.1 Limitations
This section explores some theoretical and observed limitations of the model. This section
has two purposes: (1) to identify conceptual differences between actual human beings and
the simulation that could cause differences in design decisions and (2) to indicate areas of
the model that could be improved.
7.1.1 Sequential Decision Making
For most sequential decision making problems, the most pressing limitation is the com-
putational time and effort required to calculate expected utility. Although the integral in
Equation 28 can be quickly computed with high accuracy, the number of expected utility
calculations can easily become overwhelming even for relatively simple problems. This raises
a fundamental question about the ability of the framework to model human decisions: If
the framework requires such large computational power to simulate a decision that humans
make in seconds, how can the framework claim to mimic the designer’s decisions?
In reality, humans do not consciously examine every possible outcome to determine
which action has the highest expected utility. Humans likely perform many simplifications
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to the problem, substantially reducing the computational power required. Listed below are a
few simplifications that likely cause differences between actual designers and the simulation:
7.1.1.1 Heuristics
The designer might be able to simplify the sequential decision making problem using heuris-
tics learned through education or experience. For example, designer’s usually learn to run
low fidelity models early in the design process, and high fidelity models later in the process.
From an information theory perspective, the sequential decision making algorithm comes to
the same conclusion in most cases. Using simple rules such as these, the designer can easily
eliminate several alternatives from the decision tree, substantially reducing the amount of
computation required.
7.1.1.2 Depth of Search
Examining Equation 56, the most influential contributions to the computational effort is the
number of levels to the decision problem. From a human’s perspective, this is representative
of how far into the future the human can reason. For certain classes of problems, such as
picking specific design points to run in a high fidelity model, examining current decisions in
the context of future results can be very difficult. In the high fidelity model example, the
designer may disregard the value of information and simply run the points he or she believes
to be most likely to return a good design. In Section 6.2.2 it was seen that the discount
factor was one way of reducing number of levels that the designer was required to explore;
for low values of γ, it could easily be shown that returning a decision had higher expected
utility than continuing to search. In this way, the discount factor can represent the ability of
a designer to see into the future. A highly experienced designer might have a high discount
factor, representing his or her ability to intelligently reason how to extract the most useful
information from his actions. A novice designer, on the other hand, may discount heavily,
causing every decision to appear as his or her last without any consideration of the future.
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7.1.1.3 Memory Recall
It is also possible that expert designers have stored combinations of good actions in their
long-term memory and, rather than evaluating every possibility, draw on their past expe-
rience to make decisions. This phenomenon is similar to the behavior observed in chess
players by de Groot and Simon [14]. In these experiments, chess players of varying skill
levels were observed to compare cognitive differences of expert and novice players. Simon,
summarizing the work of de Groot, write that
de Groot was unable to find any gross differences in the statistics of their thought
processes; the number of moves considered, search heuristics, depth of search,
and so on. [Chess] masters search through the same number of possibilities as
weak players.
Instead, Simon and de Groot find that chess masters possess a strong ability to recreate
chess positions after observing them for only 5 seconds, something weak players were unable
to do. However, this ability was only observed when the pieces were placed in “meaning-
ful” positions; when the chess pieces were placed randomly on the board, the chess master
was no better at reconstruction than the novice. Simon’s hypothesis for what separates
a master from a novice is their ability to draw from experience to recognize combinations
of good moves: “behind this perceptual analysis, as with all skills, lies an extensive cogni-
tive apparatus amassed through years of constant practice.” Perhaps, then, the difference
between the computational effort of the human and the machine is the human’s ability to
use experience to narrow down the best set of actions, whereas the computer examines the
problem for the first time with no prior experience.
7.1.1.4 Inter-temporal Utility
One of the assumptions made in Section 5.2 was that the designer is only concerned with
the utility of their final decision. In reality, this may not always be true. For human
beings, it can be very difficult to consider decisions in regards to the final consequences,
especially if those consequences occur at a much later time. Literature suggests that humans
use transition points to help pace their work. For example, several authors have found
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in experimental studies that teams given a deadline use the midpoint of their time as a
transition point [26, 49]. This may be one possible way that humans are able to simplify
this computationally intensive problem. By allocating certain tasks to separate blocks of
time, the individual can focus on a small subset of the problem and plan accordingly.
This seems to imply the creation of an inter-temporal utility function; the designer creates
utility functions at certain transition points based on what they would like to accomplish
at a certain time. By dividing the sequential decision making into smaller blocks with fewer
levels, the amount of computation can be drastically reduced.
Overall, the framework’s technique for choosing an alternative in a sequential decision
making problem probably does not match the reasoning of human being. However, like the
Gaussian process model and utility function in Chapter 3, the sequential decision making
algorithm represents an approximation to the designer’s reasoning. Recall that the “inter-
face” of the model between the inner environment and outer environment is the designers’
decisions and not their reasoning; as long as the simulation produces results similar to a
human’s decision, the lack of similitude in reasoning may not be significant.
7.1.2 Knowledge Model
In Chapter 3, Gaussian process models were used to model the designer’s beliefs. These
models have the benefit of being intuitive and computationally simple, they may not accu-
rately reflect a designer’s beliefs. One fundamental limitation of a Gaussian process model
is the use of normal distributions as a representation of beliefs in all situations. In many
cases, the designer’s beliefs may best be reflected by another distribution. Consider the
designer’s beliefs shown in Figure 67. Suppose the designer analyzed a design at x = 3 and
found that the f(x) was lower than the designer’s expected value. How do the designer’s
beliefs change?
If Gaussian process models are used, then the designer’s updated beliefs will appear as
Figure 68a; normal distributions with the mean generally shifted lower than the designer’s
original expectation. The black line shows the designer’s original beliefs and the probability
distributions have been drawn on the z axis. For some designers, however, Figure 68b may
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Figure 67: Prior beliefs and new information
be a more accurate reflection of the designer’s actual beliefs; the designer may find it
very unlikely that the underlying function is above his original expectation. At the same
time, he or she may now find it plausible that the underlying function is much lower than
expectation. Hence, the probability distributions have all be skewed towards lower values
of f(x). While an alternative probability distribution may more accurately represent a
human’s beliefs, implementing such a distribution is computationally difficult since Equation
3 has an analytic solution only for normal distributions.
7.1.3 Preference Model
The limitations of utility theory for articulating human preferences have already been iden-
tified at the end of Section 3.4.1. As the text indicated, humans are known not to follow the
four axioms of utility theory. However, it is possible that improvements can still be made to
the implementation of utility theory in the framework. Prospect theory, for example, offers
several modifications to utility theory that better mimic the behavior of humans [36]. For
example, prospect theory has shown that humans often do not consider events that have
very small probabilities and treat events with high probability as certain events. To model
this, a decision weight function is multiplied by the value of each outcome; this weight
function essentially modifies the tails of the probability distribution, making highly likely
outcomes appear certain and unlikely outcomes appear as impossibilities.

































(b) Beliefs represented by skewed distributions
to several decimal places. In reality, a utility function for a human cannot be defined to
such detail; humans would be unable to specify preferences consistently to that degree. The
modeler should keep this in mind when viewing the designer’s decisions. If the expected
utility between two alternatives is very close, the modeler should expect that actual humans
might be indifferent between the two options.
7.2 Usage Applications
At the end of Chapter 1, several characteristics were outlined that the model should possess.
The first of these stated that the framework should model decisions that humans actually
make, not necessarily the decisions they do make. The intention of this requirement is
that the model should be predominately descriptive in nature as opposed prescriptive or
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normative. With the details of the framework defined, we can now examine whether or not
the framework meets this requirement.
One might notice that the framework contains many normative tools: utility theory is
a normative model of decision-making; the sequential decision-making strategy is optimal
for a given utility function; even the Gaussian Process models define the probabilities in a
mathematically consistent manner. It has already been acknowledged that humans do not
follow these algorithms when making decisions; they typically do not create utility functions,
and they do not exhaust all potential possibilities. From this perspective, the decision
making algorithms appear to be more normative; they represent the optimal decision given
a set of beliefs and a utility function.
Two areas where the framework is descriptive lie in the Gaussian process models and
the utility function. The simulated designer’s Bayesian inferences depend upon the assumed
prior distribution. In Section 3.3, a custom covariance function was developed to better rep-
resent the prior distribution that a designer might have. One can form an analogy between
the prior distribution and the prior knowledge and biases that the designer possesses. By
changing this distribution via variation of the hyperparameters (or the function itself), one
can change the designer’s knowledge and learning. In this manner, the designer’s knowledge
can be seen as descriptive; it may be possible to fit a function and hyperparameters to a
human being in order to model his or her learning.
Similarly, the designer’s utility function is adaptable to a specific human being. In
this thesis, a utility function was derived based on a requirements-driven paradigm. If the
preferences and risk behavior of the designer’s utility function are aligned with that of the
organization, then this representation is normative; the designer will make decisions that the
organization desires. However, researchers have shown that representations similar to the
one presented in this thesis can be misaligned with the risk preferences of the organization
[16, 1]. This representation better aligns with the descriptive category; theoretically we
could design a utility function that closely models the designer’s actual preferences, whether
aligned or misaligned with the organization. Like the Gaussian process models, the utility
function in Equation 16 contains parameters that can be fit to a specific designer.
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Based on the flexibility of the Gaussian processes and the utility functions, the decision
making framework is perhaps best described as a continuum between normative and de-
scriptive models; by choosing effective prior distributions and appropriate utility functions,
the framework can provide the optimal decisions from the organization’s perspective. At the
same time, these models can be customized to represent a specific designer whose interests
may not align with that of the organization’s.
For the models to be truly descriptive, an element of the framework is likely missing:
a search procedure. Designer’s do not exhaustively search all possibilities, but likely use a
simpler method of deciding which action to perform. This method may involve heuristics
or a simpler a more limited search of the alternative space. The sequential decision-making
technique presented here is only one option for making decisions. In my opinion, it is a
robust method for representing reasonable behavior; at the same time, the computational
costs of this method are far too high. For the model to reach an operational level suitable
for simulation, more research should be invested in better understanding how a designer
chooses between actions.
7.3 Experimental Validation
This section concerns human subjects experiments as a method of validating the framework
and associated models. The goal of this section is not to design the details of an exper-
imental plan, but rather to explore important considerations for creating an experiment
and to suggest strategies for investigating the validity of the model. This section begins
by exploring the underlying research question of the experiment. Section 7.3.1 identifies
potential problems to avoid when creating an experiment. Finally, Section 7.3.2 suggests
experiments for validation on a conceptual level.
Perhaps the most important question to ask before designing the experiment is “what
is the experiment intending to test?” When validating this framework, the experimenter
has at least these two options:
• Validate each of the models individually (i.e., the knowledge model, preference model,
and sequential decision making algorithm)
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• Validate the simulated designer’s decisions as a whole
In my opinion, the main focus of the test should be on the latter and not necessarily test
for similitude in the individual model. The former test relies on the assumption that an
accurate knowledge model and preference model would lead to an accurate prediction in the
designer’s experiment. This would imply that designers use their beliefs and preferences and
a mathematically consistent way, which may not be true. This question of scope hearkens
back to the discussion in the motivation of the inner environment, outer environment, and
interface. If the ultimate goal of the overarching simulation is to explore how the design
problem, designer decisions, and organization dynamics interact to affect organizational
performance and system value, then the most important aspect of the model is the final
decision as this decision is the interface of this model. The framework is effective if it can
return similar decisions as a human designer given the same prior knowledge, alternatives,
and incentive structure, regardless of whether it is effective in modeling the specific beliefs
and reasoning process of the designer.
At the same time, investigating how the designer views uncertainty and preferences
could give insight into how to improve these models to make them more realistic. Data
that allows for more accurate modeling of preference and knowledge would be incredibly
useful. Instead of asking the question “can a utility function accurately model a designer’s
preferences under uncertainty?” perhaps a better question is “what utility function form
best approximates a designer preferences?” Testing individual models can also give insight
as to why the model might fail to capture human decision making. Experimenting with
individual models would provide a degree of traceability and guide the modeler on which
models need to be improved.
7.3.1 Potential Pitfalls
Throughout the development of the framework, the models and ideas were tested through
informal polls and interviews with engineering graduate students. Although the results are
not rigorously scientific, some of the observations can help inform the development of a
more rigorous human subjects experiment. A major challenge in developing an experiment
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is creating similar conditions in both the human subject and the computer simulation. This
can be a more challenging problem than it initially appears; designers typically do not think
in terms of uncertainty and utility nor do they describe their actions from an information
perspective. Therefore, care must be taken when creating experiments involving human
subjects as it is difficult to create the same initial conditions in the problem. Specifically,
the experimenter should avoid the following common pitfalls that were found through the
informal experiments I conducted.
7.3.1.1 Controlling Knowledge
As Equation 25 demonstrated, the designer’s beliefs are contingent on his utility function
and beliefs about the alternatives. Therefore, in order to create an experiment under the
same conditions as a simulation, it is important that the designer and simulation begin the
problem with the same knowledge as the simulation.
This can be accomplished in two different manners:
1. Eliciting the designer’s prior knowledge about the design problem for use in the simu-
lation: the human subject can be asked about their knowledge prior to performing the
experiment; this knowledge can then be programmed into the simulation’s Gaussian
process model.
2. Experimenting with an unfamiliar design problem: if a design problem is chosen such
that the designer has no prior knowledge, then the experimenter can easily control
the information that the human subject has at the beginning of the design process.
The former option relies on the human’s ability to specify their knowledge and uncertainty.
This can be challenging, as designers may not think of their beliefs in terms of probability
distributions. It is also contingent upon the ability to transfer that knowledge into the
simulation. The latter option is likely the most effective. By using an unfamiliar problem,




In addition to controlling the designer’s prior knowledge about a design, the experimenter
should use caution when generating this prior knowledge. Practicing designers do not
tend to view their beliefs as probability distributions. If a designer is given probability
distributions as information to use in the experiment, then his or her beliefs can actually
differ significantly from these probability distributions.
Before receiving the results of the computer simulation of the “Strategy in Variable
Fidelity Analysis” example problem, several engineering students were given the same in-
formation in the problem statement and asked to make a decision. The decisions largely
fell into two separate groups; while many chose to run the low fidelity on Design A, sev-
eral people decided to analyze Requirement 2 of Design C with the high fidelity model, an
alternative the simulated designer finds to be relatively poor (his 6th preferred option). In
my opinion, the discrepancy lies in the manner in which I facilitated the human’s beliefs.
When I inquired as to the reasoning behind the designer’s decision, one subject responded
that he would would run the high fidelity model on Design C which would “tell me how
correct my own beliefs were.” Already the designer has uncertainty is his beliefs given the
probability distribution; however, the designer’s comments imply an extra layer of beliefs
which I refer to as “meta-beliefs.” These meta-beliefs are beliefs about the prior knowledge
and an acknowledgment that the designer does not trust the information given in the prob-
lem statement. These beliefs are problematic, since the designer’s knowledge is no longer
represented by the information in Table 1. Instead, the meta-beliefs imply a wider uncer-
tainty over the distributions; while the simulation believes that the probability of Design C
meeting requirement to is approximately 77%, the human now believes this probability to
be smaller. Hence, the human designer makes different decisions than the simulation.
7.3.1.3 Eliciting Preferences
The modeler should use caution when eliciting a designer’s preferences through lotteries.
The ability to create an accurate utility function hinges on two assumptions: (1) that the
designer will be able to determine which lottery he or she prefers and (2) that the designer
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will have the same preferences when facing an actual design problem. The second assump-
tion is likely the most problematic as designers typically think of designs as deterministic
systems and not lotteries. In general, I discourage the use of pure lotteries with engineers,
such as the one in Figure 22, as the concept is rather foreign. Instead, I recommend rephras-
ing lotteries in a way that designers would find more familiar. Some examples are given in
the next subsection.
7.3.2 Suggested Guidelines Experiments
For any experiment, it is important that the incentive structure for the designer be clearly
defined. This helps to remove ambiguity in defining preferences. For example, the human
subjects can be given a reward (monetary or otherwise) depending on how well the subjects
meet the requirements for the design. Using a set reward structure, the experiment can
create the appearance of both hard and soft requirements, offering no reward if certain
requirements are not met. The human subject should also have a clear understanding of
the consequences of going over time. Alternatively, instead of time, the designer can be
given a computational “budget”. To model discounting, the designer might be allowed to
keep the portion of the budget that he or she does not use.
At the same time, the modeler should use caution when creating a reward system; this
is especially true if the modeler is trying to mimic an actual engineering organization. With
the reward structure clearly represented, the human subject may start to view the design
process as a game, and his or her behavior may depart from his or her behavior in a normal
design situation. Often the rewards for an engineer are more implicitly understood by the
engineer. For example, the designer knows that strong performance will likely lead to a
promotion in the organization in the future; the designer is not given a specific monetary
reward for a particular performance.
As mentioned above, giving subjects beliefs as probability distributions can create meta-
beliefs and lead to unintended consequences. If any probabilistic data is given to the de-
signer, it should be presented as factual information and not beliefs. In general, the use of
the word “beliefs” should be avoided when presenting information as it can lead the human
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subjects to develop meta-beliefs. Words can also be used that have an implied uncertainty.
For example, one could tell the designer that induced drag “scales with” the reciprocal of
aspect ratio and that a drag coefficient was “approximated” to equal 0.3. These words
imply that uncertainty exists in the exact relation between alternatives and attributes.
Perhaps the most effective means for generating beliefs would be to let the designer
experiment with information and form their beliefs organically. For example, the subject
could be allowed to use a low fidelity model and a high fidelity model on a “practice”
problem before the experiment begins. By comparing the differences between the models,
the designer can obtain their own ideas about the uncertainty in the low fidelity model. In
this way, the experiment avoids the use of probability distributions which tend to increase
the uncertainty of the designer.
As mentioned earlier, the human subject should be unfamiliar with the problem in
order to control their knowledge. A conceptual design problem would also likely be most
appropriate, since detailed design problems tend to contain less uncertainty. However, the
amount of information given to the designer should be as small as practical; the Gaussian
process model is able to store and parse large amounts of information simultaneously, which
an inexperienced human may not be able to match.
Using the methods described above, the modeler can create a simulation and human
subjects experiment that have very similar initial conditions. This will be helpful when
validating the designer’s decisions. However, this will provide little insight into a designer’s
preferences and beliefs. Follow-up interview questions could be useful in better understand-
ing the designer’s reasoning. However, as mentioned earlier, more accurate results can likely
be obtained if probability distributions and lotteries are avoided. Instead, these questions
can be rephrased in ways which the designer might be more familiar. For example, rather
than asking a designer to draw their beliefs and confidence intervals, the experimenter could
ask the designer “At what values of x do you think it is likely that y is greater than 5?”,
“What is the highest value of y you would expect at this x” and “At what value of x do
you trust the model the least?” If a particular distribution is assumed (such as a normal
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distribution), these questions can give insight to the general shape. Using the first and sec-
ond questions, the modeler has enough information to determine the mean and variance of
the designer beliefs. The last question can help the modeler determine where the maximum
variance in the model lies. While these questions may not give a precise distribution, they
can provide insight into the shape of the designer’s belief structure.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
8.1 Summary of Contributions
This thesis has outlined a framework for mimicking engineering decision making computa-
tionally. Chapter 3 described models for representing the designer’s knowledge and pref-
erences. A custom covariance function was derived to better represent the designer’s be-
liefs when extrapolating information. A utility function was proposed for a designer in a
requirements-driven organization. This utility function was then transformed into a multi-
attribute utility function to represent the designer’s preferences in the context of multiple
objectives. This framework was demonstrated on both a single dimension and multiple
dimension problem in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 extended the framework to account for sequential decision making. Algo-
rithms were derived to calculate expected utility for actions in addition to alternatives.
Guidelines were given for encoding these actions into the framework. The utility function
of Chapter 3 was extended to account for time and budget. In Chapter 6, the single di-
mension example from Chapter 4 was revisited to explore the effect of both the sequential
decision making and utility of time algorithm. Additionally, the sequential decision making
algorithm was demonstrated on a variable fidelity analysis problem involving three alter-
natives, two tools, and two requirements. Finally, the concept of validation with a human
subjects experiment was analyzed with several recommendations made.
Overall, the demonstrations have the shown strong potential for the framework to mimic
engineering decision making. The variable fidelity problem in Chapter 6 shows the designer
develops a clear and logical strategy when choosing actions, accounting for contingencies in
ways shared by its human counterparts. At the same time, there are still opportunities for
significant improvement as demonstrated by the first example in Chapter 6; for example,
improvements can be made to the learning model to better account for the way the designer
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updates his or her beliefs when encountering “surprising” information. As Chapter 7 indi-
cated, data from a human subjects experiment could lead to substantial improvements in
the models.
8.2 Directions for Future Work
8.2.1 Model Improvements
Many improvements can be made to the models themselves to enhance the validity of the
model. Some of these have already been identified: hyperparamter selection including noise
can be investigated to determine a robust method for learning that mimics how humans
actually learn. The shape of the utility function can be investigated to determine a more
precise for functional form for replicating designer preferences.
In regards to sequential decision making, there is much room for improvement in terms
of computation time. If robust heuristics can be determined that would simplify the decision
tree, then huge gains could be made in speed of computation. Research could also explore
the limits of humans ability to make sequential decision making to determine where the
framework might differ from that of a human.
8.2.2 Organization Simulation
As mentioned in Chapter 1, then ultimate goal of this framework is to incorporate it into an
organizational dynamics simulation. To do so, the simulated designer needs the capability
to interact with other designers and management. Chapter 5 has already shown how actions
such as consulting experts and meeting with other designers can be incorporated into the
action space. However, questions of organizational hierarchy and communication still need
to be investigated. For an individual designer, the framework is formulated in terms of in-
formation. When multiple designers are involved, this information is transferred to different
teams through communication, which can alter the information in unintended ways. These
concepts need to be investigated in order to accurately model real organizations.
The creation of such a simulation could lead to very insightful experiments. The sequen-
tial decision making algorithm’s independence from a specific reality model is especially
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powerful; running the simulation only once, the modeler can investigate under what con-
ditions the designer would make certain decisions. This enables the framework to answer
many interesting questions about the designer’s behavior, such as:
• Under what conditions would designers go over their allotted amount of time? How
do their interactions with other organization members influence their propensity to
miss a deadline?
• How good are the designers’ final designs compared to what the organization would
consider the “best” design?
• Given multiple tasks, is a designer effective in managing his or her time?
• In what ways does communication between designers improve and impede the design
process?
These are just some of the questions that could be investigated with a model of a full
organization. Similarly, the modular structure of the framework allows the modeler to test
normative models for the same design problem. For example, a normative value model
could replace the designer’s multi-attribute utility function; the results of the value model
could then be compared to the other utility functions.
8.2.3 Mechanism Design
Given the same set of actions and identical prior knowledge about a design problem, the
only thing which differentiates two designers is their utility function. Since the utility
function is derived from the designer’s incentive structure, one could ask the question “What
organization structure and incentives leads to the best organization performance?” In the
field of game theory, mechanism design attempts to design the best game in order return
a desired outcome. Hazelrigg advocates the use of mechanism design in order to align
the interests of the designer with the interests of the organization [31]. In this way, a
designer could experiment with different utility functions to determine which one maximizes
organization performance and system value.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF GAUSSIAN PROCESS MODEL COVARIANCE
FUNCTION
As mentioned in Section 3.3.2, current mean and covariance functions fail to capture the de-
sired characteristics of beliefs in extrapolation. The purpose of this appendix to to explicitly
derive the covariance function used throughout the thesis. The following assumptions were
made about the designer’s beliefs regarding the functional relationship between alternatives
and attributes:
• The slope of the underlying function is smooth and infinitely differentiable (this implies
that the underlying function itself is also smooth).
• In the absence of information, the expectation of the slope is stationary and assumed
to be zero (principle of indifference).
• The variability in slope in the extrapolated region is consistent with the variability in
slope in the interpolated region.
Since the assumptions are primarily concerned with the slope of the Gaussian process
model, my strategy for derivation was to define the slope of the Gaussian process model with
the desired properties and then to calculate the resulting mean and covariance functions.
This strategy is effective due to the fact that derivatives are linear operators; since a linear
operation on a normal distribution results in a normal distribution, the derivative of a
Gaussian process is also a Gaussian process.
The second assumption states that the slope of the expectation of the Gaussian process
should return to zero in the absence of information. If the derivative of a Gaussian process
is also a Gaussian process, this implies that the mean function for the slope is equal to
zero (since a Gaussian process returns to its mean function in the absence of information).
With the mean function of the slope defined, the only remaining choice is a selection of a
covariance function for the slope. For this derivation, the squared exponential covariance
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was chosen to represent the slope. Theoretically, any covariance function could be used; the
squared exponential was chosen primarily for its simple analytic form which can be easily
integrated. This selection implies the first assumption.
Drawing on work by Solak et al. on incorporating derivative observations into Gaussian
process models, I defined the covariance between two derivative observations as the squared
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(58)
Note that the validity of using the squared exponential covariance function is contingent
on the designer’s beliefs of the underlying function; specifically, that the slope is stationary
and continuous. If the designer did not believe these assumptions about the underlying
function then a different covariance function should be used.
The training data used in the Gaussian process models is often function value observa-
tions, not slope observations. Therefore, we require a formula for the covariance between
two function value observations. This can be found by integrating Equation 57 twice (this is
equivalent to treating the training points as integral observations on a squared exponential
Gaussian process model):












Since an integral is defined between two limits, an additional parameter, −α, must be
introduced into the equation. This parameter can be thought of as a reference point, a
known value from which all the observations are based. In other words, all functions whose
integral from −α to x does not equal the observation at x will be eliminated from the prior.
Therefore, in order to make an observation at an x location, the function value at reference
point must be fully defined. At this location, the Gaussian process assigns the mean value













Figure 69: Uncertainty is zero at reference point even in the absence of training data at the
reference
Choosing this reference point can be problematic, since no points may be known with
certainty. In a way, the Gaussian process model is adding information that we may not have.
Figure 69 represents this problem; The Gaussian process model is given only information
at x = 1. Since the reference point α is set to 0, the Gaussian process assumes a function
value at the reference. Note that this function value was not given as training data; the
Gaussian process has added information to the model that was not explicitly defined.
Fortunately, as the reference point moves infinitely far way from the data, the effect
of the reference point on the Gaussian process model tends towards zero. Therefore, by
setting α to infinity, we can achieve the desired Gaussian process model without having to
define a reference point. To do this, we leave α as variable and carry it through the integral




























Like the squared exponential function, this covariance function assumes that the under-
lying function is continuous and smooth. Although the equation appears otherwise, this
covariance function is actually stationary; the terms that are not functions of δ(x,x∗) are
eliminated after the limit is applied. Unfortunately, I have been unable to derive an an-
alytical form of Equation 8 with the limit applied for n training points. Therefore, I am
unable explicitly prove that the covariance function is stationary. However, I have derived
an explicit form for up to three training points; since the mean and variance were station-
ary in these cases, I believe this is strong evidence that the function is stationary for any
arbitrary number of training points.
The presence of the limit in Equation 8 can be computationally cumbersome, since most
programming languages are unable to symbolically evaluate the limit as α goes to infinity.
Instead, the Gaussian process model can be approximated by choosing a value of α that
is much larger than the range of x. In general, two orders of magnitude is sufficient to
produce results that are indistinguishable from evaluating the true limit. However, care
must be exercised when choosing a value of α, since values that are too large will result
in an ill-conditioned matrix. This can especially be an issue when maximizing marginal
likelihood; as can be seen in Equation 6, the second term in the equation is the logarithm of
the determinant of a covariance matrix. For ill-conditioned matrices, the determinant can
be very close to zero, resulting in very large fluctuations in marginal likelihood. Because
of this, optimizing marginal likelihood can sometimes be challenging. One strategy for
overcoming this is to use a small amount of noise in all observations, even if the noise
should be equal to zero. This effectively prevents the determinant of the covariance matrix




DERIVATION OF SEPARATED EXPECTED UTILITY EQUATION
This appendix will demonstrate how the multi-dimensional integral can be transformed into
the multiplication of several single-dimension integrals. If numerical integration methods
are used that involve a grid along each dimension, this alternative form can offer substantial
computational savings.
Consider the following scenario, where the designer is faced with three requirements: u1
and u2 are hard requirements and us is a soft requirement. The expected utility of each
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The term in brackets is simply the expected utility of x with respect to the first re-
quirement. Since this is a definite integral, this term is a constant for the remainder of the
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A similar argument can be made for the remaining hard requirements. Therefore, for n
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